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It can be said that the history of wars and violent conflicts is probably as long as 
the history of the mankind itself. More than six thousand years ago; that is how far modern 
scientists are able to go back in our history to find physical evidence of two ancient cities, 
Hamoukar and Uruk, fighting against each other in a bloody war.1 The face of the Earth 
went through significant changes since that time as the technical and economic 
development changed also the way we live and understand the world around us. 
Numerous civilizations perished and were born. Numerous inventions were discovered 
and numerous diseases disappeared. However, no matter the changes, war and armed 
conflicts have persevered. They are still present in nowadays word; affecting even more 
people than before due to the technological development and the way they impact the 
civilian population. According to the Database of Armed Conflicts, created by the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, there are around 40 active armed conflicts 
being currently fought in the world.2 
 
Armed conflicts, whether international or non-international, harshly influence the 
life of the civilian population living in the affected areas and generate a significant need 
for humanitarian assistance. The impact always depends on the particular armed conflict 
and local conditions, however, the most notorious problem is deprivation; especially 
when it comes to basic and essential supplies and services. The water reservoirs or pipes 
have been destroyed or damaged. Food or gas are precious goods as the ordinary business 
connections have been suspended and farming areas are covered by landmines. The 
electricity was shut off and there is not enough fuel for the generators. Medical supplies 
are a scarce commodity. The list could go on. It is not an exaggeration to say that in many 
cases the question of the access to humanitarian assistance is also the question of life, or 
death. Unfortunately, in recent years, humanitarian actors frequently struggled to provide 
assistance to civilians in need. The Syrian conflict, which began in 2011, has triggered 
                                                 
1 First Blood – History’s Earliest Recorded Military Conflicts. Military History Now. 13 October 2014 
<http://militaryhistorynow.com/2014/10/13/first-blood-historys-earliest-recorded-military-conflicts/> 
accessed 20 June 2016. 
2 Armed Conflicts Database. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. <https://acd.iiss.org/> 




the world’s largest humanitarian crisis since the World War II3 showing the international 
community that although there are rules governing humanitarian assistance during the 
time of armed conflicts, there are still thousands of civilians which are almost impossible 
to reach and provide with help. The rules are there, however, the reality shows that there 
is a problem, either with their application or with the compliance with them. 
 
This thesis will focus on the issue of humanitarian assistance under international 
humanitarian law. There are two reasons which made me to choose this topic. The first 
one is outlined above: it is a very urgent and current topic influencing the lives of 
thousands of people. The second reason is more personal. The field of international law 
has been at the centre of my academic and personal attention for several years now. 
Almost since the very beginning of my master studies. I have always been interested 
especially in those issues concerning armed conflicts, use of force, and post-conflict 
situations. I took me few years to realize that, for me, there was a denominator common 
to all these areas. The aim to regulate force and violence and to bring at least some small 
pieces of humanity and stability into such situations which have the instability and 
jeopardy in their very nature. International humanitarian law has always been very 
interesting for me as it represents the effort to ‘make war more human’ while still 
respecting the inevitability of its cruel character. The rules created in order to regulate 
armed conflicts have to be realistic, otherwise they would not be respected at all. This 
applies also to the rules of humanitarian assistance. They have to be realistic to be truly 
respected by the parties to the conflict. For humanitarian assistance to take place, the rules 
which govern it need to take into account not only the interests of the civilians, but also 
the interests of the fighting parties. Without their cooperation, there would be no 
assistance delivered to those in need at all. I chose this topic in order to have the 
opportunity to explore these rules and their application more closely and also with the 
intention to answer some of my own inner questions regarding their realistic use in 
practice. Moreover, I would like to focus on the field of armed conflicts and humanitarian 
law also in my future as I wish to pursue an internship at the International Committee of 
the Red Cross. 
                                                 
3 ECHO Fact Sheet: Syria Crisis. European Commission. January 2015 





1.1 Research Questions and Aims of the Thesis 
 
 As was stated above, the core issue of this thesis is the concept of humanitarian 
assistance in current international humanitarian law. The thesis aims to research, describe, 
and analyse the legal framework of the concept of humanitarian assistance in current 
international humanitarian law, to evaluate its practical application to the complicated 
reality of modern armed conflicts, and, if necessary, to propose possible measures which 
could make it more suitable for the application in nowadays armed conflicts. To reach 
this aim, the thesis will aim to answer the following research questions: 
 
1) How is the institute of humanitarian assistance in armed conflicts governed by 
current international humanitarian law? Which rules are created by the relevant 
treaty law and which have emerged through the customary law? 
2) Is the current legal framework sufficiently developed for the use in modern armed 
conflicts and is it clear enough when it comes to its interpretation and practical 
application? Does it sufficiently reflect the transformation of armed conflicts 
during the last decades? 
3) What are the weaknesses of the current legal framework? Which measures, if any, 
should be taken in order to make it more suitable for the application in the reality 
of nowadays armed conflicts? 
 
1.2 Definition and Clarification of the Terms 
 
 As was stated above, the topic of this thesis is the issue of ‘humanitarian 
assistance’. However, it is important to note that there is no general definition or 
understanding of this term which would be accepted by the whole international 
community and the doctrine.4 Different scholars, agencies, and international bodies use 
different terminology when it comes to the concept of ‘humanitarian assistance’ and to its 
                                                 
4 SANDVIK-NYLUND, Monika. Caught in Conflicts. Turku: Institute for Human Rights of Abo 




definition.5 For example, the Geneva Conventions6 and their Protocols7 speak about 
‘relief’ or ‘relief actions’ 8 , while various United Nations documents use the term 
‘humanitarian assistance’9. The concept is also frequently connected with a number of 
related terms such as ‘humanitarian aid’, ‘humanitarian relief’, and ‘relief assistance’ or 
‘relief action’.10 
 
Therefore, to maintain a clear understanding of the scope and focus of this thesis, 
it is necessary to establish a working definition of the term “humanitarian assistance” 
under which it will be used on the following pages. Given the fact that the definition is of 
a working character designed only for the purpose of this thesis, it is necessary to bear in 
mind its limitations as there are various ways through which the term can be approached. 
 
1.2.1 Negative Definition of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
 To begin with, there are three different concepts which have to be excluded from 
the understanding of the term ‘humanitarian assistance’ for the purpose of this thesis. The 
first one is the concept of ‘development aid’ or ‘development assistance’. According to 
Sandvik-Nylund, the term ‘development aid’ is distinguished from the term ‘humanitarian 
assistance’ by the emergent character of the latter and also by its different objectives “…as 
humanitarian assistance primarily aims at ensuring the survival of victims’ of armed 
conflicts.”11 Development aid is, on the other hand, more concerned with the long-term 
                                                 
5 Sandvik-Nylund (n 4) p 5-6. 
6 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field (First Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
(Second Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 
August 1949, 75 UNTS 287. 
7 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3; Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 60. 
8 Fourth Geneva Convention (n 6) Art 59, Protocol I (n 7) Art 18. 
9 UN GA Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United 
Nations. UN GA Res A/RES/46/182 19 December 1991. 
10 SPIEKER, Heike. The Right to Give and Receive Humanitarian Assistance. In: HEINTZE, Hans-
Joachim; Zwitter, Andrej (Eds.). International Law and Humanitarian Assistance. A Crosscut Through 
Legal Issues Pertaining to Humanitarianism. New York: Springer, 2011. p 7. 




perspective of the particular country or region in various sectors (e.g.: social, economic, 
political, health development, and overall welfare). 12  Also, as noted by Spieker, in 
contrast to development aid/assistance, humanitarian assistance is guided by 
humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence as enshrined in 
relevant legal norms of international humanitarian law (‘IHL’).13 
 
The second concept, which needs to be distinguished and excluded, is the concept 
of ‘disaster relief aid/assistance’. As was mentioned above, the aim of this thesis is to 
focus on the issue of humanitarian assistance only in the context of armed conflicts and 
under IHL. Thus, although some scholars understand the concept of humanitarian 
assistance also as “… [the] provision [of] goods and services essential for the survival of 
those being directly affected by man-made disasters… or natural disasters”14, the issue 
of humanitarian assistance as a relief provided to the victims of natural or man-made 
disasters which do not relate to armed conflicts will be excluded from this thesis. 
 
Finally, the last concept to distinguish and put aside is the concept of 
‘humanitarian intervention’. Although there is a minority of authors who consider the two 
terms, humanitarian assistance and humanitarian intervention, to be very close or even 
synonymous15, they will be seen as strictly separated for the purpose of this thesis. As 
stressed by Sandvik-Nylund, the understanding of ‘humanitarian intervention’ in most 
cases “includes a coercive element in the form of threats or the use of force”16 and “the 
world ‘‘intervention’’ implies further that the action is undertaken without the consent of 
the state in which intervention is taking place.”17 The world ‘assistance’ on the other hand 
                                                 
12 Factbook 2010: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. Official Development Assistance. 




accessed 20 June 2016. 
13 SPIEKER, Heike. The Right to Give and Receive Humanitarian Assistance (n 10) p 7. More attention 
to these principles and their significance in the context of humanitarian attention will be given in the 
further part of the thesis. 
14 SPIEKER, Heike. The Right to Give and Receive Humanitarian Assistance (n 10) p 7. 
15 WEISS, Thomas; MINEAR, Larry. Do International Ethics Matter? Humanitarian Politics in the Sudan. 
Ethics and International Affairs. 1991. Vol. 5 Issue 1. p 197 – 214.  
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-7093.1991.tb00238.x/abstract> accessed 20 June 2016 
16 Sandvik-Nylund (n 4) p 6. 




lacks this element of coercion and enforcement. Also, “humanitarian assistance is to be 
guided by the principle of impartiality, neutrality, and non-discrimination and to be 
motivated by humanitarian needs first and foremost.”18 Humanitarian assistance as a non-
forcible concept is understood also, for example, by the Guiding Principles adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly (‘the UN GA’) in 1991 which states that: “The 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian 
assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on 
the basis of an appeal of the affected country.”19 Thus, for the purpose of this thesis the 
term and concept of ‘humanitarian assistance’ will be perceived and used only as a non-
forcible measure not violating the territorial and political sovereignty of the affected 
States. 
 
1.2.2 Positive Definition of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
Now, when it was clarified how the term ‘humanitarian assistance’ will not be 
understood and used for the purpose of this thesis, it is time to focus on the opposite issue. 
As was stated above, there are different definitions of humanitarian assistance. According 
to Spieker: “The term humanitarian assistance, as used in the framework of armed 
conflict, addresses relief schemes provided to a civilian population – generally from 
outside.”20 Some scholars define it as “an assistance of an exclusively humanitarian 
character, provided by the international community, to meet the immediate needs of 
victims of emergency situations”21, while the World Health Organization considers it to 
be “[an a]id that seeks to save lives and alleviate suffering of crisis-affected 
population.”22 Some actors rather use the term ‘humanitarian aid’23, while others speak 
about ‘relief actions’ or ‘relief schemes’ which is the terminology provided by the Geneva 
                                                 
18 Ibid. p 6. 
19 UN GA Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United 
Nations (n 9) para 3. 
20 SPIEKER, Heike. The Right to Give and Receive Humanitarian Assistance (n 10) p 8. 
21 Sandvik-Nylund (n 4) p 6. 
22 Glossary of Humanitarian Terms. Relief Web Project. August 2008. 





Conventions and its Additional Protocols.24 
 
As stated above, this thesis will mainly operate with the term ‘humanitarian 
assistance’. With respect to the scope and aim of this paper, it will be understood as 
meaning that kind of action or aid which has an exclusively humanitarian character, aims 
to meet the essential needs of the civilian population in armed conflict situations, and is 
provided by external or internal actors (e.g.: NGOs, international organizations, States). 
When used, the terms ‘humanitarian action’ or ‘relief action’ will be regarded as 
synonyms. 
 
The reasons leading to this choice of elements are following. First, the definition 
will include only actions of an exclusively humanitarian character as the aim of this thesis 
is to focus on that kind of actions which bring relief to victims. The thesis is not intended 
to deal with that kind of actions which have a different primary motivation, e.g.: economic 
profit, military interests, or sustainable development. 
 
Secondly, the definition will include only the actions with the goal to meet the 
basic needs of the civilian population in the situations of armed conflicts. The thesis does 
not have the ambition to address the challenging complexity of post-conflict aid and 
assistance. Thus, the aim of the thesis is to deal with the issue of meeting those kinds of 
needs which are essential for the survival of the civilian population affected by an armed 
conflict. In comparison, it can be presumed that the kind of aid aiming to meet the needs 
of the civilian population in a post-conflict situation would be far more complex and long-
term; focusing not only on the absolute basics, but also on the stabilization of the situation 
and future development of the affected area. 
 
Finally, the definition of the term will include that can kind of assistance which is 




                                                 




1.3 Brief Outline of the Thesis 
 
To deal with the questions raised above, attention will be given to the following 
issues. 
 
First, the thesis will offer a brief outline of the development of the concept and 
meaning of humanitarian assistance throughout the history focusing primarily on the main 
milestones and their influence. 
 
Secondly, the thesis will focus on the circumstances which trigger the need for 
humanitarian assistance. 
 
Thirdly, the thesis will be concerned with the character of humanitarian assistance 
and with the principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality.  
The subsequent part of the thesis will deal with the issue of consent and will 
discuss whether there is an obligation to grant a consent for a humanitarian assistance and 
from whom it should be sought. 
 
Finally, the thesis will focus on the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and to 
its following aspects: the material scope, the facilitation of passage, the issue of control 
over humanitarian operations and consignments, the safety and freedom of movement of 
humanitarian personnel, and the obligations of third States. 
 
The last part of the thesis will be dedicated to the conclusion. 
 
1.4 Methods and Sources of the Research 
 
Various research methods and sources will be used to gather and process the 
adequate amount of information necessary for the elaboration of the thesis. Regarding the 
methodology, the thesis will be mainly based on the analysis of various relevant sources 
and, when necessary, their comparison. With respect to the sources, attention will be 




Additional Protocols) and their commentaries, writings of scholars in Czech, English or 
Spanish language, agreements concluded during previous armed conflicts (e.g.: 
Agreement on the Protection and Provision of Humanitarian Assistance in Sudan), useful 
national law and sources (e.g.: military manuals), documents adopted by the UN bodies 
(especially by the United Nations Security Council and by the United Nations General 
Assembly), documents of other relevant international organizations and bodies (e.g.: the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the ICRC, the Doctors Without 
Borders, etc.), and to other sources documenting previous practice and opinions of States 





2. Applicable Legal Framework 
 
 The main aim of this chapter is to examine the applicable legal framework of the 
concept of humanitarian assistance under IHL and to identify and briefly introduce its 
main legal sources. The chapter will be divided into two parts. The first one will focus on 
the applicable treaty law and the second one will be dedicated to the issue of relevant 
applicable customary law. 
 
2. 1 Applicable Treaty Law 
 
 Regarding the applicable treaty law, the most important general legal sources 
regarding humanitarian assistance are the Geneva Conventions25 and their Additional 
Protocols26: the Additional Protocol I (‘the AP I’) and the Additional Protocol II (‘the AP 
II’); all of them being multilateral international treaties.  
 
However, before proceeding to these legal instruments, a brief attention will be 
given also to The Hague Conventions of 1899 27  and 1907 28  as they were the first 
multilateral international treaties to contain rules concerning specifically the position and 
protection of civilians during the situation of war.29 The last part of this sub-chapter will 
be dedicated to the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court due to its importance in 
the context of individual criminal responsibility for the violations of four types of 




                                                 
25 First Geneva Convention, Second Geneva Convention, Third Geneva Convention and Fourth Geneva 
Convention (n 6). 
26 Protocol I and Protocol II (n 7). 
27 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1889. 
28 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907. 
29 The Hague Convention 1899 and 1907 were adopted before the introduction of the term ‘armed 
conflict’ as it is understood by current international humanitarian law. Thus, they were in fact created to 




2.1. 1 The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 
 
 The Hague Conventions of 1899 were adopted during the First Hague Peace 
Conference which was held on the initiative of the Russian tsar Nicholas II. The aim of 
the conference was to put a limit to the speeded-up armaments of all nations, create an 
effective procedure for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and adopt 
measures and rules which would make war more humane. The conference resulted in the 
adoption of three conventions and three declarations and is considered to be one of the 
milestones in the history of IHL.30 
 
In the context of humanitarian assistance and protection of civilians, the most 
significant instrument adopted during the First Hague Peace Conference was The Hague 
Convention (II) with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land together with its 
annex, the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (‘the 
Regulations’). The convention and the regulations were revised and slightly altered at the 
Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 which led to the adoption of the Convention 
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague convention [IV] of 1907)31 
which, with some minor changes, substituted The Hague Convention (II) of 1899. 
 
The most relevant provision, concerning the purpose of this thesis, can be found 
in the annexes to the Conventions, in the Regulations. At this point, it is important to note 
that the Regulations did not contain any provisions dealing specifically with the issue of 
the provision of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population affected by a war. 
However, they addressed, although in a rather general way, the behaviour of the 
occupying power towards the civilian population under its control and the consequences 
of such an occupation for it. For example, the Art 43 of the Regulations stated that: “The 
authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the 
latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, 
                                                 
30 ONDŘEJ, Jan; ŠTURMA, Pavel; BÍLKOVÁ, Veronika; JÍLEK, David and collective. Mezinárodní 
humanitární právo. Praha: C.H. Beck, 2010, p 100. 
31 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 




public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force 
in the country.”32 
 
 As mentioned above, the revised version of the Regulations was adopted in 1907. 
Thus, more than a century ago. There have been numerous international instruments, 
which deal with humanitarian assistance and the protection of civilians during armed 
conflicts more in detail, created since that time (e.g.: The Geneva Convention IV of 1949, 
the AP I or the AP II). Nevertheless, according to Ondřej, Šturma, Bílková and Jílek, some 
of the rules contained in the Regulations are still a part of the applicable international law 
as they became a part of international customary law.33 
  
2.1.1. 2 The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols 
 
As was stated above, the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols do not 
define the term ‘humanitarian assistance’. Nevertheless, they contain a basic regulation 
of the obligations and rights of the parties to the conflict and also regulate the status and 
the role of the providers of humanitarian assistance in armed conflicts. It is important to 
note that given the fact that the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols are 
primarily addressed to States, they do not directly confer rights or obligations upon 
humanitarian organizations.34 Rather, they describe situations in which States have to 
allow the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians under their power or through 
the territory which is under their power as well as those forms of assistance which are 
entitled to the protection under IHL. They also provide the requirements and conditions 




                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 ONDŘEJ, Jan; ŠTURMA, Pavel; BÍLKOVÁ, Veronika; JÍLEK, David and collective. Mezinárodní 
humanitární právo (n 30) p 101. 
34 MACKINTOSH, Kate. The Principles of Humanitarian Action in International Humanitarian Law. 
London: Overseas Development Institute, 2010 p 7. 





2. 1. 2. 1 Legal Regime of Humanitarian Assistance in International  
  Armed Conflicts 
 
The legal regime of humanitarian assistance in international armed conflicts 
(‘IACs’) is, on the general level, governed by two key treaties: The Geneva 
Convention IV and the AP I. The Geneva Convention IV was adopted on 
12th August 1949, entered into force on 21th October 1950 and there are currently 196 
State parties to the treaty.36 Given the extraordinarily high number of ratifications and its 
general acceptance by the States and other international actors, the Geneva Convention IV 
together with the Geneva Convention (I), the Geneva Convention (II) and the Geneva 
Convention (IIII) are considered not only to be universally ratified, but they are also 
perceived as the cornerstone of the contemporary IHL.37 The position of the AP I is, 
however, more complicated. In April 2016 the AP I was ratified by 174 States. Although 
this still places the AP I among the most widely accepted legal instruments in the world38, 
it cannot be considered as universally ratified as there is a number of States with strong 
military involvement in current armed conflicts or significant political power which have 
not ratified the AP I yet. For example: the USA, Pakistan, Iran, Somalia, Israel or Turkey. 
 
The legal rules governing the humanitarian assistance in the context of IACs 
distinguish between humanitarian assistance provided within the occupied territories and 
in other territories. In the context of occupied territories, Art 55 and Art 56 of the Geneva 
Convention IV lay down the obligation of the occupying power to ensure food, medical 
supplies, medical and hospital establishments and services, and public health and hygiene 
to populations in occupied territories. Regarding the issue of humanitarian assistance, 
Art 59 of the Geneva Convention IV builds on Art 55 and Art 56 stating that: “If the whole 
or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying 
                                                 
36Treaties, State Parties and Commentaries. ICRC. 
<https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treat
ySelected=380> accessed 20 June 2016. 
37The Geneva Conventions of 1949: origins and current significance. ICRC. 
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/geneva-conventions-statement-120809.htm> 





Power shall agree to relief scheme on behalf of the said population, and shall facilitate 
them by all the means at its disposal.”39 Moreover, according to Art 63 of the Geneva 
Convention IV, National Red Cross Societies or other relief societies shall be able to 
pursue their activities in accordance with the ICRC principles or under similar conditions 
and the Occupying Power may not require any change in the personnel or structure of 
these societies which would prejudice the aforesaid activities (relief schemes and 
operations). 
 
Art 69 of the AP I widens the scope of essential supplies listed in Art 55 of the 
Geneva Convention IV and strengthen the provision by stating that: “In addition to the 
duties specified in Art 55 of the Fourth Convention concerning food and medical supplies, 
the Occupying Power shall, to the fullest extent of the means available to it and without 
any adverse distinction, also ensure the provision of clothing, bedding, means of shelter, 
other supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population of the occupied territory 
and objects necessary for religious worship.”40 Art 71 of the AP I, in relation to both 
occupied and non-occupied territories, specifies the position of the personnel 
participating in relief actions and the rights and obligations of the State party towards it. 
 
There will be more attention given to the individual elements and issues of these 
provisions in the following chapters, nevertheless, it can be generally noted that „there is 
a relatively wide space provided to humanitarian organizations, provided that they are 
impartial and operate in accordance with humanitarian principles [in the context of 
occupying territories].“41 
 
Regarding the situations of IACs and non-occupied territories, the Geneva 
Conventions were drafted and subsequently signed shortly after the end of the II World 
War, bearing in mind the horrifying consequences it had on the civilian population. 
Especially in the context of the ‘total war’ approach42 and the use of blockades and sieges. 
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For example, it is presumed that during the siege of Budapest, one of the bloodiest sieges 
during the World War II, approximately 38,000 civilians died from starvation and military 
action.43 This was reflected also in Art 23 of the Geneva Convention IV which obliges 
State parties to allow the free passage of certain goods necessary for the survival of the 
civilian population. This obligation comprises consignments of medical and hospital 
stores as well as objects necessary for religious worship intended only for the civilian 
population other than its own, even if it is the civilian population of the adversary. 
However, essential foodstuff and clothes are only granted free passage once when they 
are intended for children under the age of fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases. 
Moreover, the obligation to grant free passage is subject to certain conditions. These will 
be examined in great detail later, nevertheless, as can be seen, the existence of numerous 
conditions and limitation of the free passage of foodstuff and clothes only to certain 
groups significantly weakened the strength of this otherwise very important provision.  
 
The aim of the drafters of Art 70 of the AP I was to broaden the scope of Art 23 of 
the Geneva Conventions IV in regard to the character of relief consignments and their 
beneficiaries and to create more exact rules regarding the rights and duties of the State 
parties concerned in the particular humanitarian action. In comparison with the Geneva 
Convention IV, the AP I pays significantly more attention to humanitarian assistance and 
its provisions contain more details. 
 
2. 1. 2. 2 Legal Regime of Humanitarian Assistance in  
Non-International Armed Conflicts 
  
 Regarding non-international armed conflicts (‘NIACs’), it can be observed that 
the legal framework concerning this type of armed conflicts is generally less rich of 
provisions and details in comparison with the legal framework concerning international 
armed conflicts. This is, naturally, reflected also in the context of humanitarian assistance. 
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The situations of non-international armed conflicts are under IHL governed by Common 
Art 3 of the Geneva Conventions and by the AP II. 
 
 Art 3, which is common to all four Geneva Conventions44, applies only to NIACs 
and it is, with regard to the Geneva Conventions, the only article applicable to NIACs. At 
least, as suggested by its second paragraph, until such time as a special agreement 
between the Parties will bring into force between them all or part of the other provisions 
of the Convention.45 Given its special character, Common Art 3 was during its drafting 
called by some of the delegates a ‘Convention in miniature’.46  
 
Regarding the issue of humanitarian assistance, Common Art 3 does not contain 
specific provisions governing the obligations and duties of the parties to the conflict with 
regards to humanitarian actions as, for example, the provisions of the Geneva Convention 
IV does. Nevertheless, the second paragraph of the article deals with the so-called ‘right 
to humanitarian initiative’.47 According to the second sentence of Common Art 3 para 2: 
“An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.” Thus, under this provision an impartial 
humanitarian organization is entitled to offer its services without this being seen as an 
unfriendly act or as an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of concerned subject.48 
The Commentary to the Geneva Conventions highlights that for the offer to be legitimate 
and acceptable, it must come from an organization which is both ‘humanitarian’ and 
‘impartial’ and the services offered and rendered must be ‘human’ and ‘impartial’ too.49 
However, there is no explicit provision provided by Common Art 3 which would oblige 
the concerned State to actually accept the offer, even when it satisfies the above-
mentioned criteria, and which would provide details for its execution and realization.50 
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Bearing this in mind, it should be noted that some scholars argue that obligations 
relating to humanitarian assistance could fall under Common Art 3 to some extent as they 
can be derived from the guarantees for human treatment, and the prohibition of violence 
against life and person or cruel treatment as given by para 1 of the article.51 According to 
these scholars there is a clear correlation between the prohibition of violence to life and 
cruel treatment and the obligation to provide civilian population with necessary basic 
supplies to prevent its starvation and suffering caused by internal armed conflict; for 
example, through humanitarian assistance when there are no other means. Supporting this 
argument, J. Baloro gives an example from the NIAC taking place in Sudan, where during 
one incident southern Sudanese rebel factions attacked a relief convoy destined for 
starving civilians. According to his opinion, such an attack was a clear violation of the 
principles of Common Art 3.52 Nevertheless, as pointed out by M. Torrelli who also 
supports the idea that Common Art 3 has indeed implication for humanitarian assistance, 
“the exact scope of [Common Art 3] with respect to [humanitarian]assistance is all too 
often unknown.”53 
 
 Before the adoption of the AP II, the only provision applicable to NIACs was 
the above-mentioned Common Art 3 to the Geneva Conventions. This article, however, 
quickly proved to be inadequate. Especially in the view that approximately 80% of the 
victims of armed conflicts since the end of the World War II have been victims of 
NIACs.54 Therefore, the AP II had been drafted with the aim to extend the essential rules 
of NIACs. In the fear of a possible weakening of their sovereignty, the States participating 
in the drafting and the adoption of the protocol decided to keep the text of the treaty short 
and simple. Instead of the 47 articles originally proposed, only 28 were adopted.55 
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The AP II has not reached the universal ratification yet. So far there have been 168 
ratifications by the State parties till April 2016.56 That is even less than in the case of the 
AP I. Among the non-signatories are also major political or military powers. A number of 
them is involved or heavily interested in some of the currently ongoing armed conflicts, 
e.g.: the USA, Turkey, Iran, Israel or Pakistan. From the total 28 articles of the AP II, only 
one is dedicated to the issue of humanitarian assistance.  
 
According to Art 18 of the AP II: “Relief societies located in the territory of the 
High Contracting Party, such as Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) 
organizations, may offer their services for the performance of their traditional functions 
in relation to the victims of the armed conflict… If the civilian population is suffering 
undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs 
and medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively 
humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse 
distinction shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party 
concerned”.57 The first para of Art 18 contains the right to humanitarian initiative stated 
also in Common Art 3 of the Geneva Conventions. However, a significant difference 
between Common Art 3 and the AP II regarding humanitarian assistance is created by the 
para 2 of Art 18 of the AP II which sets more detailed conditions as when humanitarian 
action shall be taken, by whom, and under which circumstances. Although the provisions 
of Art 18 of the AP II do not go into such length as the relevant provisions of the AP I, 
they are still significantly more elaborated than the single paragraph dedicated to the issue 
in Common Art 3. 
 
2.1.3 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
 
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court58 (‘the Rome Statute’) is 
the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’). It was adopted at a 
diplomatic conference in Rome in July 1998 and entered into force on 1 July 2002 upon 
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ratification by 60 States.59 As of 1 June 2016, the Rome Statute was ratified by 124 
States.60 The ICC is a permanent body and it has, under the conditions given by the Rome 
Statute, universal jurisdiction to prosecute criminals for international crimes; however, 
only for those listed in the Rome Statute. These can be divided into four groups: the crime 
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.61  
 
Regarding humanitarian assistance, the Rome Statute bears in mind both the 
protection of the humanitarian personnel and the protection of the civilians.  
 
Focusing on humanitarian personnel, Art 8 (2)(b)(III), in the context of IACs, and 
Art 8(2)(d)(iii), in the context of NAICs, define as a war crime: “Intentionally directing 
attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a 
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian 
objects under the international law of armed conflict...”62 Thus, to put in another way, 
once when they are under the protection given to civilians or civilian objects by IHL, it 
constitutes a war crime to intentionally and directly attack personnel, installations, 
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance. There is no difference 
in the subject matter for the situations of IACs and NIACs. 
 
Regarding the protection of civilians in the context of humanitarian assistance, the 
most relevant subject-matter listed by the Rome Statute is the deliberate starvation of 
civilian population which is also classified as a war crime. To be more specific, according 
to Art 8(2)(b)(xxv), which is applicable only to IACs, “[i]ntentionally using starvation of 
civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their 
survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva 
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Conventions” constitutes a war crime. As can be seen, the last sentence of the provision 
directly addresses and criminalizes obstructions of humanitarian assistance as understood 
by the Geneva Conventions. 
 
It is important to note that the Rome Statute does not contain any such provision 
directly addressing the issue of deliberate starvation during the situations of NIACs. 
  
2. 2 Applicable Customary Law 
 
Unlike in the case of the treaty law, it is more complicated to determine the 
existence of individual customary legal rules and to identify their exact content. The 
essential rule of the treaty law, regarding its binding power, is simple: Treaties apply to 
the States which have ratified them. The nature of the customary law is different. 
 
The Statute of the ICJ describes international customary law as a “general practice 
accepted as law.”63 It is generally accepted that the existence of a customary international 
law rule requires the presence of the following elements: “state practice (usus) and a 
belief that such practice is required, prohibited or allowed, depending on the nature of 
the rule, as a matter of law (opinion juris sive necessitatis).”64 As was stated by the ICJ 
in the Continental Shelf Case: “It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary 
international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinion juris of 
States.”65 Regarding the issue of state practice, according to Henckaerts, it must be looked 
at from two angles. First, what kind of practice actually contributes to the creation of 
customary international law (selection of state practice), and second, whether the selected 
practice establishes a rule of customary international law (assessment of state practice).66 
Considering the nature of behaviour, both physical (e.g.: battlefield behaviour) and verbal 
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acts (e.g.: military manuals, pleadings before international tribunals, diplomatic protests, 
national legislation, national case-law) of States constitute a state practice that contributes 
to the creation of a customary rule.67 For a state practice to contribute to the creation of a 
rule of the international customary law, it needs to be sufficiently ‘dense’. As ruled by the 
ICJ in the Continental Shelf Case, to establish a rule of international customary law, the 
state practice has to be virtually uniform, extensive, and representative.68 Nevertheless, it 
does not need to be universal. A general practice is sufficient.69 This being said, there is 
no generally given or established number or percentage of States, which is required for a 
practice to be considered ‘general’. According to the ICJ, the decision should be based 
not only on the number of States, but also on their relevance as the practice should 
“include that of States whose interests are specially affected.”70  
 
With regard to opinion juris, there has to be a legal conviction that a particular 
practice is carried out as of right.71 Thus, States engaging in the practice have to be 
convinced that they act consistently with what they consider to be a legal obligation.72 
Mere high frequency of the particular behaviour or its customary character is not 
sufficient.73 
 
A frequently discussed issue is the impact of treaty law on the creation of the 
customary law and also on the process of the determination of the existence of a particular 
customary rule. As stated by the ICRC: “Treaties are also relevant… because they help 
shed light on how states view certain rules of international rule.”74 According to the ICJ’s 
judgement in the Continental Shelf case, “multilateral conventions may have an 
important role to play in recording and defining rules deriving from custom, or indeed in 
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developing them.” 75  The degree of ratification and the number of ratification and 
accessions is undoubtedly relevant, nevertheless, it cannot constitute the only factor taken 
into consideration.76 
 
Regarding the issue of humanitarian assistance in the context of international 
humanitarian customary law and its connection with the relevant treaty law, it is generally 
accepted that the legal rules contained in the Geneva Conventions have their parallel 
counterparts also in the area of international customary law. 77  The character of the 
Additional Protocols is far more complicated and although some of the rules stated there 
are considered to be customary, that does not apply to all of them. Also, in numerous cases 
the customary status of a rule is disputed.78 
 
 Given the uncertainty of the scope and the character of the contemporary 
international humanitarian customary law, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(‘the ICRC’) decided to conduct a comprehensive study on the issue in 1995. According 
to the ICRC, the main purpose of the study was to “determine which rules of international 
humanitarian law are part of customary international law and therefore applicable to all 
parties to a conflict, regardless of whether or not they have ratified the treaties containing 
the same or similar rules.”79 The preparations began in October 1997 and the final report 
was delivered in 2005 after eight years of research and expert consultations. Nowadays, 
when the issue of IHL is concerned, the ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (‘the ICRC Study’)80  is often quoted and used as a reliable and 
qualified source, especially due to its complexity, uniqueness, and also the position of 
the ICRC as generally respected and well-established player on the field of international 
law and international relations. Still, not all findings of the ICRC Study were fully 
accepted by all states and international actors and some parts of the conclusion were 
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criticised as too progressive and not reflecting the real state practice.81 Some states, for 
example the USA, also questioned the methodology of the ICRC study. Albeit the USA 
generally accepted the methodology as theoretically introduced by the ICRC, they 
criticized the ICRC for not following it during the actual research and for putting too 
much emphasis on irrelevant or legally insufficient sources.82 
 
 There are four rules in the ICRC Study directly linked with humanitarian 
assistance: Rule 31, Rule 53, Rule 55 and Rule 56. 
 
 Rule 31 is dedicated to the protection of humanitarian relief personnel as it states 
that: “Humanitarian relief personnel must be respected and protected.”83 According to 
the ICRC Study, rich state practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary 
international law in both IACs and NIACs. It also recalls that “[t]he safety and security 
of humanitarian relief personnel is an indispensable condition for the delivery of 
humanitarian relief to civilian populations in need threatened with starvation.”84  
 
Rule 55 focuses on the access to humanitarian relief for civilians in need stating 
that: “The parties to the conflict must allow free and facilitate free rapid and unimpeded 
passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, which is impartial in character and 
conducted without any adverse distinction, subject to their right of control.”85 According 
to the ICRC Study, state practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international 
law applicable in both IACs and NIACs.86 The rule is complex as it contains numerous 
obligations and rights. To begin with, it states that humanitarian relief, intended for 
civilians in need, has to be impartial in character and conducted without any adverse 
distinction. Also, the parties to the conflict are obliged to allow and facilitate ‘passage’ of 
such humanitarian relief and this passage has to be rapid and unimpeded. Finally, the rule 
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declares the right of the parties to the conflict to control the above-mentioned passage of 
humanitarian relief. 
 
Rule 56 is concerned with the free movement of humanitarian relief personnel: 
“The parties to the conflict must ensure the freedom of movement of authorized 
humanitarian relief personnel essential to the exercise of their functions. Only in case of 
imperative military necessity may their movements be temporarily restricted.”87As in the 
case of the Rule 55, according to the ICRC Study, the Rule 56 has been established by 
the state practice as a norm of customary international law. To highlight the main parts, 
the rule contains the obligation of the parties to the conflict to ensure the of freedom of 
movement of humanitarian relief personnel. However, it also states that these personnel 
have to be authorized and their freedom of movement limits to the scope essential to the 
exercise of their functions. More importantly, the rule grants an exception to the above-
mentioned as it declares that the movement of humanitarian relief personnel can be 
restricted, but only in the case of imperative military necessity and for a limited time. The 
ICRC also notes that “the obligation to ensure freedom of movement is a corollary to the 
obligation to provide access to civilians in need and the prohibition of deliberately 
impeding the delivery of humanitarian assistance (Rule 55).”88  
 
Rule 53 contains the prohibition of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare 
stating that: “The use of starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare is 
prohibited.”89 Rule 54 is also considered by the ICRC Study to be a norm of customary 
international law for both the situations of IACs and NIACs. The rule prohibits the 
starvation of civilian population as a method of warfare without any exception. The ICRC 
Study also states that: “Rules 54-56 are a corollary to the prohibition of starvation of 
civilians as a method of warfare” This means, according to the ICRC Study, that “denying 
access of humanitarian aid intended for civilians in need, including deliberately impeding 
humanitarian aid (see Rule 55) or restricting the freedom of movement of humanitarian 
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relief personnel (see Rule 56) may constitute violations of the prohibition of starvation.”90 
 
At this point, it should be noted that this thesis will still use the ICRC Study as 
one of the main sources when discussing or elaborating related issues. However, it is 
necessary to highlight that given the above-mentioned criticism, the thesis will strongly 
aim not to use the ICRC Study as the only source when dealing with the issues of 
international customary law and will put emphasis also on introducing other relevant 
sources. 
  





3. Brief History of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
 Although the contemporary concept of humanitarian assistance has its roots in the 
modern era, the actual acts of providing material or medical assistance to people in need 
in the times of armed conflicts91 can be traced through hundreds of years of history across 
the whole globe. According to Davey, Borton and Folley, there were two main, albeit not 
exclusive and mutually connected, influences behind these ‘acts of humanity’: religious 
belief and the articulation of the laws of war.92 The world of ancient and medieval wars 
was not completely without rules and these rules had, very often, a religious origin. 
According to Leslie Green, “since the earliest time there has been recognition that 
humanity and the future survival of society demand that limitations be placed upon the 
means and methods of warfare.”93 Thus, various religious believes and ethnical or moral 
codes derived from them significantly influenced the way civilians and their essential 
needs were approached during wars. The Christian idea of charity, the Islamic tradition 
of zakat94, the ‘codes of honour’ established in ancient China or by Japanese samurais, 
and the ‘laws of chivalry’ created in the medieval Europe95 are only some of the best 
known examples. Therefore, even in the pre-modern times there were calls for 
compassion and help for those civilians affected by wars and conflicts on one side as well 
as for rules and limitations governing the conduct of fighting forces on the battlefield on 
the other side. However, these rules were not universal and static. They varied depending 
on culture and time epoch. What is more, they were not always of a legal nature and 
frequently depended on the will and attitude of the leaders of the fighting forces. Similarly, 
they were not as comprehensive as those established by modern IHL and did not apply to 
all civilians indiscriminately. Also, people belonging to foreign cultures or believing in 
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different religion were commonly labelled as ‘barbarians’ or ‘infidels’ and treated in a 
significantly less favourable manner.96 
 
 The advance of ‘humanitarian’ sentiment through the history was, therefore, 
generally slow and limited. At least till the 18th century, the time of J. J. Rousseau and E. 
de Vattel, to which the beginning of the rise of a new philosophical discourse, secular 
humanitarianism, can be traced.97 This movement played an important role especially 
during the 19th century when it led to the creation of various humanitarian initiatives and 
development of so-called humanitarian principles98 . According to Davey, Borton and 
Folley, there was a series of factors which contributed to this flourishment of 
humanitarian initiatives and a new way of thinking at that time. First, the technologies 
invented by the industrialising nations increased the human cost of the conflicts. Secondly, 
improvements in transport and communication technology made the world a smaller and 
more connected place.99 Also as noted by D. Forsythe: “Armed conflict was becoming 
less and less chivalrous jousting contest for the few, and more and more a mass 
slaughter.”100  
 
It was one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century, the Battle of Solferino (1859), 
which gave the impulse for the foundation of an organization which is nowadays known 
as the ICRC and which has played a fundamental part in the creation and also the 
application of the modern concept of humanitarian assistance. The ICRC, originally ‘The 
Committee of Five’, was founded in 1863 at the suggestion of Henry Dunant. Dunant was 
a Swiss businessman who, as a witness of the Battle of Solferino, made his mission to 
call for the development of international treaties to guarantee the neutrality and protection 
of those wounded on the battlefield as well as medics and field hospitals. He also strongly 
advocated for the creation of national and international relief societies. 101  In 1864, 
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following Dunant’s persuasion, the Swiss Government organized a diplomatic conference 
where the first Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
in Armies in the Field was adopted. 102  The treaty, which was the first multilateral 
convention with the purpose of affirming IHL, was originally signed by 16 States.103 It 
was ratified by 57 States until its replacement by the Geneva Conventions of 1906.104 The 
convention obliged the state parties to care for wounded soldiers, no matter the side they 
fought for, and introduced the red cross on a white background as a unified emblem for 
the medical services. 105  It accorded neutrality to ambulances and their personnel, 
protected humanitarian actions of civilians assisting the wounded, and granted the Red 
Cross a formal mandate to provide neutral and impartial assistance to civilian and military 
victims of conflict under the organization of national Red Cross Committees.106 
 
 It is important to note that the early conventions applicable in the situations of 
war107 did not put a great emphasis on the well-being of the civilian population and 
included only isolated provisions relating to them.108 As noted by McAllister-Smith: “In 
theory, civilians were not involved in direct hostilities, a general principle of the law of 
war being that military operations were confined to armed forces. Specific safeguards for 
the civilian population were therefore usually thought to be superfluous.”109 However, as 
the I World War showed such premises were wrong and outdated. The I World War had 
far reaching consequences for civilian populations as it claimed millions of civilian 
victims who died due to malnutrition and famine, epidemics, unbearable conditions of 
forced labour, aerial bombing, and atrocities committed by the fighting forces.110 After 
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the I World War, third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
was drafted and adopted. 111  The ICRC also prepared a preliminary draft of a new 
convention for the protection of civilians including the rights to relief supplies and 
correspondence. Although the final version, so-called Tokyo Draft, was approved at 
the 1934 International Conference of the Red Cross in Tokyo, its submission before a 
diplomatic conference was stopped by the outbreak of the World War II.112 After the war, 
the draft was reviewed and formed the basis for the Geneva Convention IV which was 
adopted in 1949.  
 
During the both world wars, the civilian populations often struggled to cover their 
basic needs, especially those relating to food and medical supplies. The applicable legal 
rules of IHL at that time did not prohibit states to use starvation of civilian population as 
a mean of war as well as it did not oblige them to accept offered humanitarian assistance 
to ensure that the essential needs of the civilian population are covered.113 Starvation of 
the civilian population as a method of warfare had not been prohibited by the treaty law 
until the adoption of the AP I in 1977. Regarding the customary law, the existence of such 
a rule prior to 1977 is highly debatable and it was, according to Spieker,  most unlikely, 
at least till the end of the II World War.114 Netherlands, Greece, Japan; these are examples 
of some of the countries which were during the II World War affected by deliberate 
starvation.115 Although there were some provisions concerning the protection of civilian 
population against the consequences of war and their protection in occupied territories 
contained in the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed 
to The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, these were not sufficient. The Geneva 
Convention IV adopted in 1949 was the first multilateral treaty focusing exclusively on 
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the status and protection of civilians during the time of armed conflicts. As was discussed 





4. Triggers of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
 There are several preliminary conditions which have to be fulfilled for IHL rules 
relating to humanitarian assistance to be ‘activated’. In other words, states are not obliged 
to allow the provision of humanitarian assistance under every circumstance. The system 
of IHL including the specific rules governing humanitarian assistance lays down specific 
requirements establishing to what kind of situations these rules apply.  
 
To briefly outline: First, there has to be a situation of an armed conflict. Secondly, 
the affected state, or an armed group controlling the particular territory, has to be in a 
situation when it is unable to fulfil the needs of the civilian population by its own means, 
and thirdly, the civilian population has to be in a need of the humanitarian assistance. 
Subsequently, regarding the actual execution of the humanitarian assistance, the 
assistance has to fulfil certain requirements relating to its character and it needs to be 
approved by the State (or States) concerned. This chapter will focus on the first three 
issues. Chapter V. will deal with the character of humanitarian assistance and Chapter VI. 
will be dedicated to the question of consent. 
 
4. 1 Applicability of International Humanitarian Law 
 
 The concept of humanitarian assistance as understood by this thesis is governed 
by the rules of IHL. Thus, the situation has to fall within the ‘ratione materie’ of IHL for 
the relevant legal rules relating to humanitarian assistance to be applied. To put it another 
way, if IHL does not apply to a certain situation then, naturally, neither its legal rules 
covering the issue of humanitarian assistance. The ‘ratione materie’ of IHL is tightly tied 
to the situations of armed conflicts as the vast majority of its legal norms is applicable 
exclusively during the times of armed conflicts.116 Only a minority of the legal norms of 
the contemporary IHL is applicable also during the time of peace; these being, for 
example, the obligation to disseminate the knowledge of IHL or the obligation to de-mine 
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the affected areas after the end of an armed conflict.117 The legal norms related to the 
issue of humanitarian assistance under IHL fall within those applicable only during the 
time of armed conflict. Therefore, there has to be a situation of an armed conflict for them 
to be applicable. 
 
 The history of the legal term ‘armed conflict’ is a rather interesting one. For 
centuries, both lawyers and the general public were using the term ‘war’ when describing 
violent fights and encounters among adversaries. Similarly, the legal norms governing 
these wars created together the so-called ‘law of war’. However, from the legal point of 
view the term ‘war’ was problematic as it applied only to armed encounters of high 
intensity among states.118 Moreover, some of the legal instruments governing the laws of 
war were applicable only to declared wars. When combined together with the vague of 
some of the commonly used terms it was, as noted by the Commentary to the Geneva 
Conventions, “possible to argue almost endlessly about the legal definition of war”119 as 
“[a] state which uses arms to commit hostile act against another state can always 
maintain that it is not making war, but merely engaging in a police, or acting in legitimate 
self-defence.”120 One of the examples of such a situation was the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria, which was a de facto war between the Japan and China at the beginning of 
the 1930’s.121 Although there was, in reality, a long-term military confrontation between 
the two countries together with severe atrocities such as bombing of civilians or firing 
upon shell-shocked survivors, an official war was never declared by neither of fighting 
parties.122 Thus, various legal documents containing rules governing the situations of 
‘war’ could not be applied.  
 
The term ‘armed conflict’ was introduced during the 1940’ to avoid these 
situations and to sever the ties between the political factors and the application of the rules 
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of war. In other words, the decision whether there was ‘a war’ taking place had been 
frequently based on political declarations or disputable legal or subjective interpretations. 
On the other hand, the term ‘armed conflict’ is a broader one and the decision, whether 
there is an armed conflict taking place or not, is primarily based on objective factual 
circumstances.123 Thus, the Geneva Conventions adopted in 1949 were drafted with the 
concept of ‘armed conflicts’ in mind. Regarding the exact meaning of the term, in 1995, 
in the Tadic case, the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia defined 
armed conflict as “[a] resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups 
within a State.”124 As can be noticed, the definition contains numerous vague or not 
clarified term, for example the notice to ‘protracted armed violence’. However, as recalled 
by Ondřej, Šturma, Bílková a Jílek: “It is disputable whether it is even possible to make 
the definition more accurate. As there is a conflict of two legitimate interests: the interest 
to have the most accurate definition… and the interest to maintain necessary its 
flexibility.”125 
 
 4. 2 Inability of The Primary Actor to Cover the Needs of the  
 Civilian Population 
 
 The second condition of the application of the relevant IHL legal norms governing 
the issue of humanitarian assistance is connected with the inability of the primary actor 
to provide the necessary assistance by itself. The primary actor can be a State or a 
non-state actor (e.g.: an armed group) depending on the type of the conflict.  
 
  As highlighted by numerous sources, for example by the International Law 
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Commission126, the UN GA127, the Commentary to the AP II128 or by various scholars129, 
the primary subjects in chief of the organizing of relief actions are States. The role of 
other actors, providers of humanitarian assistance, should be of a subsidiary character; 
reserved for those situations when the primary actor is unable to adequately fulfil the task. 
This aspect also mirrors the above-mentioned non-forcible character of humanitarian 
assistance and its distinction from the so-called ‘humanitarian intervention’. Providers of 
humanitarian assistance are, as noted by the Commentary to APs, “… called upon to play 
an auxiliary role by assisting the authorities in their task.”130 
 
 In other words, a humanitarian action should take place once, when the affected 
State, or the armed group controlling the area, are unable to cover the basic needs of the 
civilian population and thus prevent its suffering.131 In such situation, the role of the 
providers of humanitarian assistance should complement the efforts undertaken by the 
State or the party controlling the particular territory.132 On the other hand, when the party 
to the conflict is capable to adequately cover the needs of the civilian population, there is 
no need for a humanitarian action to be undertaken. Nevertheless, it is worth the notion 
than in reality such situations are rare exceptions. 
 
4. 3 Level of Suffering of the Civilian Population 
 
 Another requirement to be fulfilled for humanitarian assistance to take place is a 
certain level of the suffering of the civilian population caused by the lack of basic supplies 
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and services. Thus, even when there is a situation of an armed conflict and the affected 
State is not able to cover all needs of the civilian population, the suffering caused by the 
situation has to reach to a certain level for the relevant IHL provisions of humanitarian 
assistance to be applicable. This condition is only logical as it is inherently linked to the 
very essence of armed conflicts that they negatively influence the life quality of those 
affected by them. However, the scope of their impact on the civilian population depends 
on various factors. Therefore, it does not always lead to such lack of supplies and services 
which would endanger civilian lives. As will be demonstrated, the threshold which has to 
be reached depends on the type of the conflict and the legal instruments applicable. 
 
 Regarding the situations of occupied territories in IACs, Art 59 of the Geneva 
Convention IV sets relatively low threshold stating that a humanitarian action should take 
place once when “the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is 
inadequately supplied.”133 As the case of civilians living in non-occupied territories is 
concerned, Art 23 of the Geneva Convention IV does not literally specify a certain level 
of suffering of the civilian population as a preliminary condition to be met. Nevertheless, 
according to Gillard, when reading between the lines it can be deduced that there has to 
be, at least, a need for the particular supplies enlisted by Art 23, e.g.: medical and hospital 
stores, foodstuff or clothing.134 When read together with the AP I, the threshold appears 
to be quite similar as in the case of occupied territories as Art 70 of the AP I states that 
relief actions shall be undertaken “if the civilian population of any territory under the 
control of a Party to the conflict, other than occupied territory, is not adequately provided 
with the supplies mentioned in Art 69…”135 
 
The main difference between the provisions regarding occupied territories and to 
the non-occupied territories as provided by the Geneva Convention IV on one hand and 
by the AP I on the other hand, considered from the ‘level of suffering due to the lack of 
supplies and services’ point of view, is in the lists of the supplies which have to be 
unavailable or lacking. Art 59 of the Geneva Convention IV, applicable to the occupied 
territories, makes reference to foodstuff, medical supplies, and clothing. However, the list 
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seems to be rather demonstrative than exhaustive as the provision states that the 
humanitarian assistance shall “consist, in particular, of the provision of consignments of 
foodstuff, medical supplies and clothing.” 136  Art 23 of the Geneva Convention IV, 
applicable to non-occupied territories, mentions “consignments of medical and hospital 
stores and objects necessary for religious worship intended only for [all] civilians of 
another High Contracting Party” and “consignments of essential foodstuff, clothing and 
tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases.”137 
Regarding the AP I, Art 70 makes reference to Art 69 which enlists “clothing, bedding, 
means of shelter, other supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population…and 
objects for religious worship.”138 Obviously, the scope of the supplies stated by Art 69 of 
the AP I is broader than the one given by Art 23 of the Geneva Conventions IV. For 
example, Art 23 of the Geneva Convention IV limits the consignments of foodstuff only 
to certain groups of the civilian population. Nevertheless, when taking into account the 
practical point of view, it can be concluded that in the reality these above-mentioned 
differences are not significantly important. That is to say that, for example, in the context 
of Art 23 of the Geneva Convention IV, it can be presumed that no one will examine 
whether mothers, children under fifteen, and maternity cases are the only groups suffering 
from the lack of foodstuff. Rather, the situation of the whole population will be examined 
regarding to all essential supplies: foodstuff, medicaments, clothing, bedding, and the 
means of shelter. 
 
 In contrast with IACs, where the thresholds are relatively similar, the regulation 
of NIACs is quite a different story; once again showing the significant difference between 
the legal rules governing the situations of IACs and NIACs. Under Geneva Conventions 
the only provision applicable to NIACs is Common Art 3. As stated above, beside the 
incorporation of the right to humanitarian initiative, Common Art 3 does not contain any 
elaborated rules governing the issue of humanitarian assistance. At least not at the first 
sight. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2.1.2.2, there are scholars who find a correlation 
between certain obligations relating to humanitarian assistance and the prohibition of 
violence to life and person or cruel treatment as guaranteed by Common Art 3. In such 
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case, the prohibition of violence to life and person or cruel treatment would also indicate 
where the threshold necessary for the triggering of the humanitarian assistance lies. Thus, 
there would be need for a humanitarian action to take place once when the humanitarian 
situation would threaten the survival of the civilian population affected. 
 
 Contrary to Common Art 3, there is an explicit threshold in AP II as Art 18 
provides that “[i]f the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of 
the supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuff and medical supplies…”139 
Therefore, there are two main conditions. First, the civilian population affected by NIAC 
has to suffer ‘an undue hardship’, and secondly, this hardship has to be caused by a lack 
of the supplies essential for its survival.  
 
There are no details regarding to the term ‘undue hardship’ which would assist 
with its interpretation. Also, as stated by the Commentary to the AP II: “[I]t is not possible 
to draw up an exhaustive list of criteria to determine at what point the population is 
suffering ‘undue hardship’, but it is appropriate to take into account the usual standard 
of living of the population concerned and the needs provoked by hostilities, particularly 
medical requirements which are covered by the very general term ‘medical supplies’.”140 
Thus, it can be argued that the starting point for the assessment of each situation should 
be the standard of living of the particular population in the particular state before the 
outbreak of the conflict. This is actually an important argument which can have serious 
consequences and also quite a paradoxical result. The difference among the standards of 
living worldwide is enormous. For example, the GDP (per capita) of Norway in 2014 was 
97,300 USD. The GDP of the Czech Republic was 19,526 USD. On the other hand, Haiti, 
Uganda, the Central African Republic, or, for example, Democratic Republic of Congo 
did not reach even 1,000 USD with the GDP of the Central African Republic making only 
334 USD.141 A similar range of differences applies also to such areas as access to health 
care, water or foodstuff. Therefore, hypothetically, what could be considered as a ‘undue 
hardship’ for the civilians of an originally well-doing and developed state currently 
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struggling with NIAC, can be, when it comes to the availability of medical care and basic 
supplies, the everyday life of civilians living in another country. 
 
Moving to the second condition, the undue hardship has to be caused by “a lack 
of the supplies essential for its survival.”142 Regarding the character of these supplies, the 
provision mentions foodstuff and medical supplies. Given the words used, “…supplies 
essential for its survival, such as…”, it can be presumed that the list is demonstrative and 
therefore not limited only to foodstuff and medical supplies.  
 
When compared with the threshold set for the situation of non-occupied territories 
in IACs, the one created by Art 18 of AP II is clearly higher. As it can be presumed that 
‘undue hardship’ applies to more serious situations than ‘inadequate provision’ of certain 
supplies. However, when compared with the conditions set by Common Art 3 as deduced 
above, the threshold is clearly lower as ‘undue hardship’ still does not have to mean a 
situation which threatens the lives of the affected civilian population. 
 
Finally, it is also necessary to recall that “[t]he need for a relief action and the 
extent of its urgency must be assessed in every case individually on a factual basis 
depending on the actual requirements.”143 
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5. Beneficiaries and Providers of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
5.1 Beneficiaries of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
 The aim of humanitarian assistance is to provide help to suffering civilian 
population and to the victims of armed conflicts. However, to properly interpret and apply 
those rules of IHL dealing with humanitarian assistance, it is also necessary to define the 
terms ‘civilians’ or ‘civilian population’ to determine who the beneficiaries of 
humanitarian assistance exactly are.  
 
5.1.1 The Geneva Convention IV 
 
As far as the Geneva Convention IV is concerned, the main relevant provision 
regarding humanitarian assistance are Art 10, Art 23, and Art 59. It is important to 
highlight that each of these provisions addresses different group of beneficiaries. 
 
 According to Art 10: “The provisions of the present Convention constitute no 
obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red 
Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of 
the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of civilian persons and 
for their relief.” 144  The aim of this provision is to prevent other provisions of the 
convention from being interpreted and applied in a way which would pose obstacles for 
a humanitarian action undertaken by an impartial humanitarian organization under the 
consent of the Parties to the conflict. The beneficiaries of this provision are ‘civilian 
persons’. However, it is important to stress that the Geneva Convention IV does not 
provide a definition of the term ‘civilian persons’. It only defines the term ‘protected 
persons’. According to the Commentary to Geneva Conventions it is necessary to 
distinguish between these two terms. The Commentary suggests that the term ‘civilian 
person’ or also ‘civilian’ is broader and actually encompasses the term ‘protected 
persons’. 145  The argument that the term ‘civilians’ or ‘civilian person’ as used, for 
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example, in Art 10 is broader supports also the fact that ‘when the Geneva Conventions 
need to limit the scope of the word ‘‘civilian’’, they do it expressly, as in the case of the 
wording of Art 23 [of the Geneva Convention IV]’.146 
 
 Regarding the situation of occupied territories, the Geneva Convention IV creates 
a highly protective regime identifying all the ‘population’ as the beneficiary of the 
obligation to provide humanitarian assistance imposed on the Occupying Power.147 As 
stated by Art 59: “If the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is 
inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of 
the said population…” 148  As can be noted, the provision omits qualifying the said 
population as ‘civilian’. By doing so it determines that the beneficiary of the said relief 
schemes is the whole population of the occupied territory, not only the ‘civilian 
population’. Thus, the wording of the provision implies that “the benefit also extends to 
members of the armed forces belonging to the occupied state and detained in the occupied 
territory.”149 This was also noted by the travaux préparatoires according to which: “The 
Working Party has omitted the word ‘civilian’ before the word ‘population’… being of the 
opinion that the case of relief intended for troops in camps in occupied territory must also 
be provide for.”150 
 
 This being said, although the Geneva Convention IV does not provide a definition 
of the term ‘civilian person’ or ‘civilian’, such a definition can be found in the AP I. As 
will be examined in the following subchapter, there is also a definition of the term 
‘civilians’ which has emerged as part of international customary law. 
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5.1.2 The Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and the  
International Customary Law 
 
  The AP I. provides a negative definition of civilians in Art 50 determining that “[a] 
civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to 
in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this 
Protocol.” Thus, civilians are all persons who are not combatants (members of armed 
forces).151  
 
Regarding international customary law, according to Rule 5 of the ICRC Study, 
the definition is the same as the one created by the AP I.: “Civilians are persons who are 
not members of the armed forces.”152 The same applies to the definition of ‘civilian 
population’. According to both the AP I and the ICRC Study, “[t]he civilian population 
comprises all persons who are civilians.”153 It is crucial to note that in case of doubts 
there is a presumption of the status of civilian. Thus, until the opposite is proved the 
person whose status is in doubt is considered to be a civilian.154 
 
 Regarding those specific provisions of the AP I which deal with humanitarian 
assistance , Art 70 of the AP I. uses following words: “If the civilian population of any 
territory under the control of a Party to the conflict, other than occupied territory, is not 
adequately provided…”155 Thus, the beneficiary of the humanitarian assistance is the 
civilian population of the affected territory; not only the civilian population of 
another High Contracting Party as was the case of Art 23 of the Geneva Convention IV. 
The same applies also to the occupied territories. According to Art 68 of the AP I: “…the 
Occupying Power shall… also ensure the provision of clothing, bedding, means of shelter, 
other supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population of the occupied territory 
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and objects necessary for religious worship.”156 Interestingly, in this case, contrary to 
Art 59 of the Geneva Convention IV, the provision does limit the beneficiaries to ‘civilian 
population’ instead of using broader term ‘population’. By doing so the provision 
excludes members of the armed forces belonging to the occupied state and detained in the 
occupied territory from beneficiaries of this rule.  
 
5.1.3 The Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions and the  
 International Customary Law 
 
 When addressing the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance, Art 18 of the AP II. 
uses the term ‘civilian population’. However, contrary to the AP, the AP II. does not 
contain a definition of the term ‘civilian’ or ‘civilian population’. According to the ICRC 
Study, a definition similar to the one which was encompassed in the AP I was included 
also in the draft of Additional Protocol II.157 The definition used by the AP I was amended 
to read that “a civilian is anyone who is not a member of the armed forces or of an 
organized armed group” and it was subsequently adopted by consensus in Committee III 
of the Diplomatic Conference which led to the adoption of the AP II. However, the 
definition was dropped at the last moment of the conference as part of a package aimed 
to simplify the text.158 As noted by Kalshoven, the lack of the definition is a significant 
and damaging omission, since the distinction between civilians and armed forces tends to 
be more difficult to draw in NIACs.159 
 
 When considering the identity of the beneficiaries of Art 18, the Commentary to 
the AP II. states following: “The civilian population means all persons who do not or no 
longer participate in hostilities, including those deprived of their liberty for having 
committed an act related to the conflict.”160 To support this opinion the commentary 
refers to Art 5 para (1)(c) of the AP II which expressly recognized the right of persons 
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deprived of their liberty to receive relief: “[Persons whose liberty has been restricted] 
shall be allowed to receive individual or collective relief.”161 
 
 As far as customary international law is concerned, the definition which, 
according to the ICRC Customary Study, emerged as a norm of customary international 
law applies to both IACs and NIACs. Thus, “[c]ivilians are persons who are not members 
of the armed forces”162 and “[t]he civilian population comprises all persons who are 
civilians.”163 
 
5.2 Providers of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
 According to the Commentary to Geneva Conventions, there are four main types 
of providers of humanitarian assistance: States, international organizations, the ICRC and 




The Geneva Convention IV and the AP I do mention States as providers of 
humanitarian assistance, however, these references are made only in the context of 
occupied territories and those States which are in the position of Occupying Powers.165 
However, despite the fact that the Geneva Convention IV and the AP I did not mention 
States as providers of humanitarian assistance also outside the framework of occupying 
territories, in nowadays reality States are one of the main contributors. As noted in the 
Commentary to Geneva Conventions: “[States] are frequently involved in relief activities 
through their civilian and military personnel, both of which are increasingly trained and 
specialized in providing assistance in situations of both natural disaster and armed 
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conflict…”166 For example, the United States are generally considered to be the biggest 
provider of humanitarian assistance in the world.167 
 
Given the fact how complex logistic network it is necessary to create in order to 
successfully gather, deliver, and provide humanitarian assistance, the main benefits of 
States as providers of humanitarian assistance is, undoubtedly, the scope of their resources, 
their know-how and experience, and also the capacity and the discipline of their personnel. 
 
On the other hand, there are also potential weaknesses and problems of the strong 
States’ involvement in the provision of humanitarian assistance. No matter the origin of 
the provider, the aid or help delivered in the context of an armed conflict has to have a 
certain character to be regarded as ‘humanitarian assistance’. Meaning, as will be closely 
examined in the following chapter, it has to respect the principles of humanity, neutrality, 
and impartiality. States as providers of humanitarian assistance are often under the 
suspicion of pursuing other interests than the humanitarian ones. This being said, their 
actions are frequently seen as an effort to enforce their own political or even military aims.  
 
For example, on 11 August 2014 Russia announced its plan to dispatch a 
humanitarian convoy to Luhansk, a Ukrainian city which, finding itself in the midst of a 
NIACs, was cut off from electrical power, water, food, and gas supplies.168 The convoy 
was presented as being of an exclusively humanitarian character delivering only supplies 
necessary for the civilian population (e.g.: grain, sugar, sleeping bags or medicaments).169 
The announcement met with a swift refusal from the Ukrainian government and a wave 
of criticism and suspicion coming mainly from the governments of Western countries and 
from the top representatives of NATO. By its opponents the convoy was often compared 
to the infamous Trojan horse opening a way for a possible Russian military invasion of 
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Ukraine. 170  On the other hand, the Russian representatives accused the Ukrainian 
government of a deliberate obstruction of a well-intentioned humanitarian assistance. 
According to the Russian side the aim of the obstruction had nothing to do with IHL as 
with the effort to gain a military advantage and prolong the suffering of civilians in 
Luhansk.171 
 
5.2.2 International Organizations 
 
 International organizations as providers of humanitarian assistance frequently 
benefit from similar advantages as States as far as the amount and scope of resources and 
the know-how and experience are concerned. Moreover, a humanitarian action carried out 
by a well-established and respected international organization will less likely face a 
suspicion of having ulterior political or military motives. On the other hand, the decision-
making process concerning the launch of a humanitarian action can be more complicated 
as it depends on the interests and opinions of its members. Among the international 
organizations which also focus on the provision of humanitarian assistance are virtually 
all main regional international organizations as, for example, the African Union, the Arab 
League, the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or the 
Caribbean Community. 
 
On the global scale the most important and active international organization in the 
context of humanitarian assistance is the United Nations. As stated by Art 1 para 3 of 
the United Nations Charter, it is one of the main purposes of the organization “to achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character…” 172  The part of the system responsible for 
coordinating responses for emergencies is The Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (‘OCHA’). 
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5.2.3 The ICRC, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red  
Crescent and the National Societies 
 
 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement which consists of the 
ICRC, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent, and the National Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies is a global humanitarian network and also one of the 
main and most respected providers of humanitarian assistance.173 The ICRC, as the oldest 
body of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, “is an impartial, 
neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to 
protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them 
with assistance” and “[it] is responsible for directing and coordinating the Movement's 
international relief activities.”174 Regarding the National Societies of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent, there are currently 190 of them around the world and “[they are] made up of 
volunteers and staff, who provide a wide variety of services, ranging from disaster relief 
and assistance for the victims of war, to first aid training and restoring family links.”175  
 
It is important to note that the ICRC and the Nationals Societies of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent are the only organizations literally mentioned by the Geneva Conventions 
and by the APs as possible providers of humanitarian assistance. This does not mean, of 
course, that they are the only possible providers, but that the relevant provisions usually 
use them as a ‘role-model’. For example, when speaking about humanitarian action in the 
context of occupying territories, Art 59 of the Geneva Convention IV directly refer to the 
ICRC stating that: “Such [relief] schemes…may be undertaken either by States or by 
impartial humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross…”176 Regarding the national societies, one of numerous examples can be found in 
Art 18 para 1 of the AP II which directly refers to them: “Relief societies located in the 
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territory of the High Contracting Party, such as Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and 
Sun) organizations, may offer their services for the performance of their traditional 
functions in relation to the victims of the armed conflict.”177 It is worth a notion that the 
provision speaks about the ‘traditional functions’ of these organizations clearly 
addressing their long existence and also their traditional and respected position. 
 
Speaking about tradition and respect, these two factors are one of the most 
significant advantages of the ICRC and the National Societies of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent often allowing them to reach people and places which are for other humanitarian 
actors inaccessible. 
 
5.2.4 Non-Governmental Organizations 
 
 Under the term ‘non-governmental organizations’ (‘NGOs’) are generally 
understood voluntary, usually non-profit, private organizations, not affiliated with any 
government, and pursuing public policies and goals.178 They can be organized on local, 
regional, or international level.  
 
As mentioned above, the ICRC and the National Societies of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent are the only organizations literally mentioned by the Geneva Convention IV and 
the APs as possible providers of humanitarian assistance. However, the wording of the 
relevant provisions clearly suggests that NGOs as private entities can also offer their 
services as the references to the ICRC and to the National Societies of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent are merely of a demonstrative character.179 As noted by the Commentary to 
the APs: “The term ‘relief society’ should be understood in its traditional broad sense. 
The Red Cross Movement, while playing a role of prime importance, does not have a 
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monopoly on humanitarian activities, and there are other organizations capable of 
providing effective assistance.”180 
 
Among the most active, respected, and well-established NGOs providing 
humanitarian assistance are, for example, the Doctors Without Borders, Oxfam, or the 
International Rescue Committee. 
 
Finally, it is important to stress, as was also mentioned in relation to States as 
providers of humanitarian assistance, that no matter its character (e.g.: State, NGOs, 
international organization), all providers of humanitarian assistance have to proceed with 
respect and in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. 
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6. Character of Humanitarian Assistance 
  
As mentioned above, not every kind of help or aid provided in the context of an 
armed conflict can be regarded as ‘humanitarian assistance’. The institute of humanitarian 
assistance in armed conflicts is governed by the above-mentioned applicable provisions 
of IHL. Those concern not only the process of providing of the assistance, but also its 
character. Thus, for an action or assistance to qualified as ‘humanitarian assistance’ under 
IHL, it has to have to be of a nature requested by these legal provisions. In other words, 
any action or assistance which does not comply with the criteria and principles given by 
these legal rules would simply be not covered by them.181 
 
According to the majority of legal doctrine and international actors, the institute 
of humanitarian assistance is based on three fundamental principles which have to be 
respected182. These are – humanity, neutrality, and impartiality.183 Together they created 
a ‘triad’, mentioned also in the UN GA resolution 46/182 (1991) which states that: 
“Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, 
neutrality and impartiality.”184 However, it is important to note that the exact applicability 
and content of some of these principles is not fully established and remains questionable. 
More attention to this issue will be given later. 
 
 Regarding the applicable legal framework, the Geneva Conventions and their 
Additional Protocols do not literally mention the terms ‘principles’ or ‘fundamental 
principles’.185 They can be seen more as a concept created through the years by the legal 
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doctrine. Nevertheless, the legal instruments do clearly specify the character of relief 
actions putting emphasis especially on the aspects of humanity and impartiality. 
 
The most elaborated provision is offered by Art 18 of the AP II which speaks 
about: “relief actions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian 
and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse distinction.”186 
Art 70 of the AP I. contains similar provision requesting relief actions aimed to civilian 
population to be: “…humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any 
adverse distinction…”187 While comparing the exact wording of these two provisions, 
there is a visibly stronger emphasis on the ‘exclusively humanitarian’ nature of the relief 
actions given by the AP II. Taking into account the fact that the AP II governs the 
situations of NIAC, it can be presumed that this emphasis is one of the many cases of the 
AP II drafters trying to highlight and protect the principle of state sovereignty and 
underline the ‘non-intervening’ character of humanitarian assistance as much as possible.  
As for the Geneva Conventions, Art 59 of the Geneva Convention IV states that a relief 
action may be undertaken by States or by ‘impartial humanitarian organizations’; putting 
emphasis on the impartiality but, which is interesting, not including expressly also the 
requirement of the action itself to be of a humanitarian nature. 
 
  At this point, it is important to recall that although there are provisions governing 
the issue of humanitarian assistance in the Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocols as well as provisions requiring these actions to be guided by certain principles, 
there are no definitions or more detailed specifications of the terms ‘humanitarian’ or 
‘impartial’ in these instruments. Thus, to determine what it actually means for a 
humanitarian assistance to be impartial or humanitarian, it is necessary to examine also 
the available practice and opinions of legal doctrine and relevant international actors. This 
will be done in a great detail in the following sub-chapters. Each sub-chapter will be 
dedicated to one of the three fundamental principles. 
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 It should be noted at this point that the character of humanitarian assistance was 
addressed also by the International Court of Justice (‘the ICJ’) in 1986 in the 
Nicaragua vs. United States case.188 When examining the principle of non-intervention, 
the ICJ ruled that “the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in other 
country, whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as 
unlawful intervention.”189 However, the ICJ highlighted, there are characteristics of such 
aid which have to be present and as a guide used the first and second fundamental 
principles declared by the Twentieth International Conference of the Red Cross; namely 
the principle of humanity and the principle of impartiality (non-discrimination).190 Thus, 
according to the ICJ such an action must be “limited to the purposes hallowed in the 
practice of the Red Cross, namely ‘to prevent and alleviate human suffering’, and ‘to 
protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being’’191 and it must be 
undertaken with respect to the principle of non-discrimination.192 Once when the action 
fulfils these requirements, it should not be regarded as an interference in the armed 
conflict or as a hostile act. The same applies for a mere offer of a humanitarian 
assistance.193  
 
6. 1 Principle of Humanity  
 
 The origin of the English word ‘humanity’ comes from the French ‘l’humanité’; 
meaning the feeling of active kindness or goodwill towards all the mankind.194 The 
original meaning of the word reflects also the core of the principle itself. The affected 
civilian population and the aim to provide it with the necessary aid and supplies should 
always be at the core of every humanitarian assistance. According to Jean Pictet, the word 
‘humanitarian’ characterizes “any action beneficent to man”. 195  In the doctrine of 
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the ICRC, the principle of humanity has three elements: a) to prevent and alleviate 
suffering b) to protect life and health (through providing the necessary aid and treatment) 
and c) to assure respect for the individual.196 An action or an assistance of a humanitarian 
nature should always aim to contain these elements. Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
in the real world it is probably impossible to fully achieve all of them. No humanitarian 
assistance, no matter its scale or economic or human resources invested, is capable to 
completely prevent and alleviate all suffering or to protect the life and health of all 
members of the affected civilian population. However, the principle does not demand 
from it to do so. In this case, the main issue is the very intention of the action and its 
implementation, not the result. 
 
As stated by Sandvik-Nylund: “The principle of humanity dictates that such aid 
should consist of goods and services essential to the survival of the population, that it 
should be provided to the civilian population deprived of the basic necessities of life as a 
result of conflict, and that the purpose of the aid should be to alleviate human suffering 
and protect human life, health and dignity.”197  
 
As stated by the Commentary to the AP I, “[t]he humanitarian character of the 
relief action is fulfilled once it is clear that the action is aimed at bringing relief to victims; 
i.e., in the present case, the civilian population lacking essential supplies.”198 With the 
principle of humanity is closely tied also the very nature of the services and items 
provided by the humanitarian assistance. The principle is violated when the aid is not 
provided with the intention to help the civilian population, but it aims to support, directly 
or indirectly, one of the parties to the conflict.199 For example, the provision of military 
material or services of a military nature cannot, naturally, fall within the scope of 
‘humanitarian assistance’. 
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6. 2 Principle of Impartiality 
  
 The second fundamental principle is the principle of impartiality. Art 59 of the 
Geneva Convention IV, Art 18 of the AP II and Art 70 of the AP I; all these provisions 
mention the requirement of ‘impartiality’, either in the connection with the nature of the 
humanitarian assistance provided or with the character of the provider. According to 
OCHA: “Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to the 
ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the 
suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent 
cases of distress.”200 
 
Jean Pictet, when working on the fundamental principles of the ICRC, isolated 
three elements of impartiality.201 All of them can be found in the definition above: non-
discrimination, proportionality, and the absence of subjective distinction. 
 
Regarding non-discrimination, “[n]o distinction should be made between the 
beneficiaries of aid for the sole reason of belonging to a particular group, except on the 
ground of humanitarian necessity.” 202  The prohibition of such discrimination in the 
context of humanitarian assistance is specifically enshrined in both Additional Protocols 
to the Geneva Conventions. Art 18 of AP II as well as Art 70 of AP I requires for the relief 
actions for the civilian population to be conducted “without any adverse distinction.” 
Regarding specific kinds of adverse distinction, Art 9 of the AP I and Art 1 of AP II 
provide open-list stating the following: race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any 
other similar criteria. Thus, the principle of non-discrimination refers to the real object of 
the humanitarian action, the persons who are suffering, and removes all objective 
distinctions between these individuals.203  
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The second element of the principle of impartiality, as identified by Jean Pictet, is 
the principle of proportionality which is closely linked with the above-mentioned 
principle of non-discrimination. While the principle of non-discrimination requires all 
human beings to be treated and valued equally, the principle of proportionality lays down 
the only criteria according to which the humanitarian assistance should be distributed 
among the suffering civilian population: the intensity of its need (so-called ‘sharing 
according to needs’).204 Thus, that the assistance will be afforded according to need. 
There is only rarely enough personnel, supplies, medication, and food to fully cover the 
needs of all affected civilians in the uneasy reality of current armed conflicts. Priorities 
must be made as to who will get the medical treatment first, how to distribute food 
packages when there is not enough of them for everyone, etc. Principle of proportionality 
demands the only acceptable determining factor for such a decision to be the actual need 
of the particular individual and its urgency. Therefore, the assistance should be distributed 
in a way which will correspond the greatest need.205  
 
However, although the principle of proportionality in the context of humanitarian 
assistance is generally perceived as firmly embodied in IHL206, the actual scope of its 
applicability remains questionable. Generally, the principle should require for the 
humanitarian assistance to be first provided to those in the greatest need, no matter, for 
example, the side of the conflict. Yet, as highlighted by Mackintosh, there is no obligation 
of the providers of humanitarian assistance to actually operate on all sides of the conflict 
or on the whole territory of the conflict.207 Sometimes, some areas of the battlefield are 
less accessible for the assistance to be provided there or it is from the political, security 
or mere financial reasons even impossible for the providers to reach them. As observed 
by the Commentary to the AP I: “[The principle of non-discrimination and the principle 
of proportionality are] a general aim and an ideal which cannot always be achieved, 
especially in a limited action.”208 
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The most complicated, when facing the harsh reality of armed conflicts, is the last 
element of the principle of impartiality which requires that “there should be no subjective 
distinction: no individual decision on whether the recipient is innocent or guilty, good or 
bad, and hence deserving or undeserving of assistance on any basis other than need.”209 
According to this principle, the moral questions of guilt and innocence, good and evil, 
and villains and victims have no space when determining the beneficiaries of 
humanitarian assistance. The main criteria should always be the level and the urgency of 
the need of the particular individual. Thus, for example, when seriously injured, 
a perpetrator of a war crime should be given the priority over an innocent little child in 
less critical condition. Of course, this is an extreme example. Nevertheless, the core aim 
of the principle remains the same: to remove any subjective distinctions.210 
 
This being said, the last decades brought numerous cases of the unwillingness of 
the international actors or also the public to truly understand and respect the full 
consequences of the implementation of this principle weighting its real implications on 
the scales of morality. For example, many called for a distinction to be made between the 
‘good’ and the ‘bad’ during the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide. Among the Hutu which 
fled from the country during the last days of the genocide in the fear of the Rwanda 
Patriotic Front forces (‘the RPF’) 211  were not only innocent citizens, but also the 
perpetrators of the genocide. According to Prunier, around two million Hutu fled Rwanda 
to refugee camps set up by the UNHCR in neighbouring countries.212 Given the high 
percentage of genocide perpetrators among the refugee camps population, the UNHCR 
and involved humanitarian organizations were by some criticised for ‘feeding the 
killers.’213 Another case which got under the scrutiny and criticism of some States and 
                                                 
209 MACKINTOSH, Kate. The Principles of Humanitarian Action in International Humanitarian Law 
(n 34) p 6. 
210 Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1997 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
(n 127) p 854. 
211 Once they crossed the boarders, the presence of RPF forces led by Tutsi, Paul Kagame, accelerated the 
end of the genocide. However, thousands of Rwanda Hutu decided to fled the country in the fear of possible 
retaliation from the hands of RPF. 
212 PRUNIER, Gérard. The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. Kampala: 1999, Fountain Publishers 
Limited, p. 312 – 314. 
213 LEADER, Nicholas. The Politics of Principle: The Principles of Humanitarian Action in Practice. 




also the public were a first aid courses provided by the ICRC to the Taliban fighters in 
Afghanistan. Due to the fact that the courses were provided to the US armed forces, in 
order to maintain its impartial status, the ICRC offered them to the Taliban too.214  
 
6. 3 Principle of Neutrality 
 
 The last fundamental principle to be discussed is the principle of neutrality. Before 
moving forward, it is important to underline that although being often quoted as a 
principle of humanitarian assistance and actions, the principle of neutrality is not literally 
mentioned in the Geneva Conventions or in the Additional Protocols in the context of 
humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, “There are provisions [in the Geneva Conventions 
and the APs] that can relate to aspects of neutrality.”215 For example, Art 23 of the 
Geneva Convention IV obliges the party to the conflict to allow free passage of goods 
intended for the civilian population of another party to the conflict though its territory. 
However, the obliged party is obliged to do so only if it has no reason to fear that these 
goods may be diverted or that they may bring a military advantage to the enemy. 
Reference to the principle of neutrality and the obligation of the personnel of 
humanitarian organizations not to engage in hostilities can be found also in Art 71 para 4 
of the AP I which states that: “Under no circumstances may relief personnel exceed the 
terms of their mission under this Protocol… The mission of any of the personnel who do 
not respect these conditions may be terminated.”216 
  
Although not being specifically mentioned in the Geneva Conventions and 
the APs, the principle of neutrality is often highlighted by various international actors.217 
As was stated above, neutrality is one of the principles demanded by the UN GA 
resolution 46/182 (1991), it is mentioned in the Charter of the Doctors without Borders218 
and it is one of the fundamental principles of the ICRC.219 Neutrality of the provider of 
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the humanitarian assistance is often expressively required also by the warring parties. For 
example, in Colombia, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, a paramilitary group which 
was engaged in an armed conflict with the Colombian government from 1997 to 2006,220 
when stating its criteria for accepting contact with humanitarian organizations, demanded 
also their impartiality, confidentiality, and neutrality.221 
 
Mackintosh identifies two elements of the principle of neutrality in the context of 
humanitarian assistance: ideological neutrality and non-participation in hostilities.222 
Ideological neutrality means that humanitarian organizations and their personnel should 
refrain from making public statements as to the reasons of the conflict and should refrain 
from expressing support to the cause of one of the parties to the conflict. 223  By 
disrespecting the principle of ideological neutrality, a humanitarian organization could 
discredit itself and risk being seen as untrustworthy and having a bias. That could lead to 
the denial of its access to the conflict zone by the particular fighting party. For example, 
based on its long and stabile reputation as a neutral organization, the ICRC was the only 
humanitarian organization initially allowed to access Mogadishu during the armed 
conflict in Somalia in 1990’s.224 However, humanitarian organizations are not obliged to 
remain silent when facing serious violations of human rights.225 This approached has been 
adopted also by the ICRC. Although the organization generally maintains a strong 
commitment to the principle of neutrality and on the base of confidentiality does not 
provide detailed information regarding its activities and findings, it reserves the right to 
publish them in exceptional cases. Especially in the context of serious human rights or 
IHL violations when there was no improvement of the situation no matter its efforts and 
activities.226 
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Second element, is the obligation to refrain from hostile activities. Thus, 
humanitarian organization providing humanitarian assistance must not engage in the 
hostilities, directly or indirectly. 227  As stated by Mackintosh, non-participation in 
hostilities is “at the very core of the provisions for humanitarian assistance in the 
Conventions… as these are principally designed to ensure that relief does not advantage 
the adverse party, which might otherwise indirectly involve the relief providers in the 
conflict.”228 This aspect, of non-participation in hostilities, is stressed also by the OCHA 
guidelines in the provision dealing with the issue of neutrality in the context of 
humanitarian assistance. It reads as follows: “Humanitarian assistance must be provided 
without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or 
ideological nature.”229 As a hostile conduct by humanitarian organizations and their 
personnel would be considered, for example, following: transporting weapons in their 
vehicles, storing weapons in their premises, attacking combatants, allowing one of the 
parties to use their logistic facilities and means of communication, spreading propaganda 
among the civilian population, using or disclosing strategic information, and enlisting 
troops.230 It should be noted than possession of weapons by the humanitarian personnel 
for their own personal defence and the use of private security personnel belonging to one 
of the warring parties for their premises or means of transport cannot be qualified as a 
hostile conduct.231 Nonetheless, some humanitarian organizations, as for example the 
ICRC, made their own decision not to carry weapons and use the armed private security 
personnel for their protection in order to strengthen their neutral and unbiased 
character.232 
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7. The Issue of Consent 
 
 There are two important questions connected with the issue of consent. First, in 
which situations a consent for the facilitation of humanitarian assistance has to be given, 
and secondly, from whom it should be sought. The legal framework differs depending on 
the type of armed conflict. Thus, different legal rules apply in situations of NIACs, IACs, 
and occupied territories in IACs. 
 
 As stated above, humanitarian assistance is a non-forcible measure based on the 
principles of neutrality, humanity, impartiality, and also on the respect towards the 
sovereignty of affected States. To forcibly push States to accept it would be a violation of 
the very principles on which the concept is built.233 However, on the other hand, States 
are bound by their obligations under IHL. These obligations affect also the issue of 
humanitarian assistance and the question whether there is a duty to accept it or not and if 
so, under which circumstances. Thus, the interpretation of the relevant legal provisions, 
encompassed in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, and the proper 
identification of relevant customary rules are crucial as “the extent of the obligations 
relating to humanitarian assistance is completely dependent on the interpretation of the 
concept of agreement.”234 
 
7.1 The Obligation to Grant Consent to Humanitarian Assistance 
 
 The strongest provision leading to the conclusion that it must be allowed for 
humanitarian assistance to take a place, in order to alleviate the suffering of civilians, is 
Art 59 of the Geneva Convention IV. This particular provision applies in occupied 
territories.235 According to the article: 
 
“If the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately 
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supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said 
population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal. Such schemes… may 
be undertaken either by States or by impartial humanitarian organizations such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross…”236 
 
 According to Y. Dinstein, “the obligation imposed on the Occupying Power to let 
such relief consignments reach the civilian population is unconditional”.237 This opinion 
is supported also by a number of other scholars.238 However, as will be demonstrated, the 
same cannot be said about the obligation of parties in other types of armed conflicts. 
 
Regarding the situation of civilians in the national territory of a party to IAC, the 
relevant provision is to be found in Article 70 of the AP I. 
 
“If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to the 
conflict, other than occupied territory, is not adequately provided with the supplies 
mentioned in Art 69, relief actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character 
and conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken, subject to the 
agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions…”239 
 
On the first sight the added phrase ‘subject to the agreements of the Parties 
concerned’ clearly reveals a greater concern for the protection of state sovereignty than 
the above-mentioned Article 59 of the Geneva Convention IV. However, it also creates a 
space for possible obstructions. As stated by Y. Dinstein: “As long as relief actions are 
contingent on an agreement by all concerned, one cannot speak of a genuine obligation 
to enable free passage to humanitarian assistance to civilians.”240 
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At this point it should be noted that so far the AP I has been ratified by 174 
states.241 The United States of America, Iran, and Pakistan signed the protocol, but have 
not ratified it so far.242 Another states, notably Turkey, India, and Israel, have not even 
signed it. The customary status of AP I is questionable.243  
 
Nevertheless, regarding the consent to humanitarian assistance in the context of 
IHL customary law, according to the ICRC Study, although “most practice collected does 
not mention this requirement [to be granted the consent] ... [I]t is nonetheless self-evident 
that a humanitarian organization cannot operate without the consent of the party 
concerned.”244 This can be deduced also from the above-mentioned natural caution of 
states when it comes to possible interferences into their internal affairs. It is unthinkable 
that States would, out of their concern for sovereignty, have accepted the obligations 
regarding humanitarian assistance if the requirement of their consent with the action had 
not been included.245 
 
The relevant treaty provision for NIACs is encompassed in Art 18 of the AP II.: 
  
“If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the 
supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, relief actions 
for the civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature 
and which are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken subject to 
the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.”246 
 
Again, the access of humanitarian actors to the territory of the affected State is 
conditioned by its consent. The part of the text concerning the consent is slightly changed 
from the one used in Art 70 of the AP I as the phrase ‘subject to the agreement’ was 
replaced with ‘subject to the consent’. According to Sandvik-Nylund: “The words are in 
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principle synonymous. However, ‘consent’ seems to imply less formality in the way in 
which the permission is granted.”247  
 
It is important to note that so far the AP II has been ratified by 168 States.248 States 
like Pakistan, United States of America, and Iran signed it, but have not proceeded to the 
ratification.249 A number of others, like for example Iraq, India, Turkey or Israel, did not 
even signed it. Although moving slowly towards universal participation,250 its customary 
status is still disputable and not generally accepted.251 
 
In a NIAC situation involving a State which has not ratified the AP II, the only 
treaty law which remains applicable is Common Art 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Albeit 
there is a mention regarding humanitarian assistance in Common Art 3, it is of a strictly 
non-obligatory nature 252  stating that: “An impartial humanitarian body, such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the 
conflict.”253 Thus, the said bodies can offer their help and assistance, however, there is no 
obligation imposed on the parties to the conflict to accept it.  
 
Regarding the requirement of consent to humanitarian assistance in NIACs in the 
context of IHL customary, the ICRC Study presumes that there is a requirement of such 
consent also in the situations of NIACs.254 In other words, humanitarian assistance cannot 
take place without the consent of the relevant parties to the armed conflict. As was 
mentioned above, generally, States are very cautious about protecting their sovereignty 
when creating binding rules concerning IHL and humanitarian assistance. They are even 
more cautious when it comes to the rules governing NIAC; as can be deduced from the 
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travaux preparatoire of the AP II.255 Therefore, it is unlikely that they would support the 
creation of such a customary IHL rule which would allow humanitarian assistance to take 
place in NIACs without their consent. 
 
7.2 Arbitrary Denial of the Consent 
 
Having said that, the mere fact that the discussed legal rules require consent of the 
parties to the conflict does not mean that there are no limitations to the deliberation 
whether to grant such a consent or not. As stressed by Bothe et al. when 
interpreting Art 59 of Geneva Convention IV, Art 70 of the AP I, and Art 18 of AP II: “If 
parties had an unlimited right to refuse assistance, the first part of the sentence(s), 
imposing an obligation that relief actions shall be undertaken, would be devoid of sense… 
Both parts of the sentence(s) have to have their weight: the obligation and the requirement 
of an agreement.”256 Although there are situations when a party to the conflict can legally 
refuse to grant the consent for humanitarian assistance, such a decision cannot be arbitrary.  
 
As stated by the Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, the acceptance of relief 
action is the rule, whereas refusal should always be considered an exception.257 “Consent 
to humanitarian operation must be granted as a matter of principle… and can only be 
refused for valid and compelling reasons.” 258 A party refusing consent has to do so for 
‘valid reasons’, not for ‘arbitrary or capricious one’.259 The opinion that a consent for 
humanitarian operations cannot be arbitrarily withheld has been supported by various 
scholars260 and documents of international organizations.261 It is also considered to be a 
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customary rule according to the ICRC Study.262 
 
So far there is little clarity about what kind of behaviour exactly qualifies as an 
arbitrary refusal of consent.263 There is no exact definition provided by the treaty law and 
so far the issue has never been addressed by an international or national tribunal, human 
rights mechanism or a fact-finding body.264 On the other hand, there are several examples 
which have been discussed by the doctrine or by the international community and which 
are generally accepted as establishing situations of the arbitrary denial of a consent to 
humanitarian assistance. An uncontroversial example is considered to be a situation 
“when the civilian population is threatened with starvation and a humanitarian 
organization which provides relief on an impartial and non-discriminatory basis is able 
to remedy the situation.”265 Refusal to give consent to such an operation is considered as 
arbitrary not only by the ICRC,266 but also by various scholars.267  
 
Another example, according to Gillard, is a situation when consent to medical 
relief operation would be refused on the grounds that medical supplies and equipment 
could be used to treat wounded enemy combatants.268 Such argumentation would be 
unacceptable due to the fact that wounded and sick – including the enemy´s combatants 
– are equally entitled, to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, to 
the medical care required by their health condition.269 No distinction on other basis than 
a medical one can be made.270 Based on the same reasoning, a denial of the consent to a 
humanitarian operation based on the intention to discriminate against a particular group 
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or section of the population, for example because of its ethnicity, would be also 
considered as arbitrary.271 
 
 Once given consent, can always be withdrawn. Nevertheless, such a withdrawal 
should always be based on a legitimate ground and it should never be arbitrary or used as 
a way to reach political aims or to gain political power. Unfortunately, the practice shows 
frequent cases of the opposite. For example, in March 2009, the Government of Sudan 
expelled 13 international NGOs and revoked the licences of three national NGOs 
operation in Darfur. The expulsion came shortly after the ICC issued an arrest warrant for 
the Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir who was charged with war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.272 This was not the first case when NGOs had been expelled from the 
Darfur area. In early 2006, the Norwegian Refugee Council, responsible for the co-
ordination of humanitarian assistance in the Kalma camp (the largest camp for 
internationally displaced persons at that time in Darfur) was instructed to cease all its 
operations in Darfur.273 Similarly, in November 2007, the head of OCHA in South Darfur 
was expelled for unspecified violations of the ‘rules of humanitarian action’.274  
 
7.3 Identity of the Party in Respect of which Consent is Required 
 
 An important question connected with the issue of consent is from whom it should 
be sought. In this case it is especially necessary to distinguish between the situations of 
IACs and NIACs as the identity of the parties to the conflict differ. Thus, the following 
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7.3.1 International Armed Conflicts 
 
When it comes to IACs, the answer is not very complicated. Art 70 of AP I requires the 
consent of ‘the Parties concerned in such a relief action.’275  The most important is 
considered to be the consent of that State party to the conflict in whose territory the 
operations are intended to be implemented.276 Gillard also supports the opinion that 
“although treaties does not expressly address this, it is clear that that consent is required 
both for relief actions carried out in-country and for cross-border operations”277 and that 
“the modalities of the operations do not affect the requirement of consent.”278 
 
The situation of occupied territories is governed by Art 59 of the Geneva 
Convention IV. According to this article, the consent to humanitarian assistance is to be 
sought from the occupying power, however, only under the condition that it is exercising 
effective control over the occupied territory and, consequently, has assumed 
responsibilities towards the civilian population.279 
 
7.3.2 Non-International Armed Conflicts 
 
 In the cases of NIACs the situation is more complicated. Art 18 (2) of the AP II 
requires the consent of “the High Contracting Parties concerned.”280 Available sources 
show that the early draft of the provision referred to the consent of ‘the party or parties 
concerned’, implicitly referring also to non-state actors (e.g.: armed opposition groups, 
non-state armed groups). However, during the following negotiations the reference was 
removed together with other expressions which could be interpreted as recognizing 
insurgent parties or as granting rights to their members.281 According to the Commentary, 
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the phrase ‘High Contracting Parties’ refers to no other subject than to the State involved 
in the particular NIAC.282 This view was supported by a number of scholars283 and also 
by some of the General Assembly resolutions adopted on the issue of humanitarian 
assistance.284 Thus, it can be concluded there is general understanding that the term ‘High 
Contracting Parties’ does not include the above-mentioned non-state actors. 
 
 Bearing this in mind, such interpretation of the term ‘the High Contract Parties’, 
however, does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the non-state actors are not 
bound by the relevant IHL rules. Although not parties to Geneva Conventions and the APs, 
according to numerous scholars and international actors, 285  non-state actors, as for 
example armed opposition groups, are subjects sui generis of IHL and thus they are bound 
by the relevant IHL norms. Their subjectivity is considered to be of a functional character, 
meaning that it is derived from the factual part that they play in NIACs.286 The aim of this 
subjectivity vested upon them is to ensure that all parties to the conflict are equally 
obligated to respect relevant IHL norms.287 Thus, it can be deduced that according to this 
approach it would be necessary for the relevant provider of humanitarian assistance to 
obtain both, the consent of the State party and also the consent of the non-state actor. 
 
It should be noted that there are also other approaches towards the relevant 
provision.  
 
For example, according to some scholars, the consent of a non-state actor not 
supported by the consent of the relevant State party could suffice in situations where the 
humanitarian operation would transit only through such a part of the state territory, which 
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would be effectively controlled only by the non-state actor, and would not intervene in 
the territory under the state control.288 Thus, according to this opinion, if the territory 
controlled by the opposition is accessible by a sea or can be directly reached from a third 
country territory, the consent of the government of the affected State would not be 
required. 289  This approach is based on an analogy with the rules applicable in the 
situations of occupation. In such situations it is not the consent of the State with legal title 
which is required, but that of the State which has an effective control over the particular 
territory; thus the consent of the occupier.290 
 
However, it is necessary to recall that those interpretations, which exclude the 
consent of the relevant State as a necessary requirement, face several obstacles. First, as 
was stated above, the AP II was adopted mainly with the States interests in mind, the 
generally accepted interpretation of the phrase ‘High Contracting Parties’ does not include 
non-state actors291 and the AP II deliberately omits any reference to non-state actors as 
subjects of the IHL. Secondly, the relevant state practise shows that as a matter of fact, 
states generally consider themselves to be very concerned by humanitarian operations 
which are carried out in the opposition held territory and do not support their execution 
without their consent.292 For example, in 1987 Sri Lanka strongly objected to the airdrops 
of humanitarian supplies for the Tamil population in the besieged city of Jaffna which 
were carried out by India without the Sri Lanka’s government consent. In reaction to the 
air drops, Sri Lanka accused India of violating its sovereignty and territorial integrity.293 
It should be, however, noted that Sri Lanka’s reaction could be motivated not only by its 
legal opinion, but also by its tense political relations with India. 
 
On the other side, any approach excluding the consent of non-state actors also 
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meets with obstacles, especially once when a territory under their control is concerned. It 
is unrealistic that a humanitarian assistance could be facilitated on a territory under the 
control of a non-state actor without its consent, especially from the security and logistic 
reasons. As noted by Gillard: “Whatever the legal position, as a matter of practice the 
agreement or acquiescence of the opposition to relief operations for civilians in territory 
under its control, or transiting through such territory, will be required to implement the 
operations in a safe and unimpeded way.’294 As stated in a report of the UN Secretary 
General by Kofi Annan: ‘[b]ecause non-state armed groups may exercise de facto control 
over areas of territory where population groups are in urgent need of humanitarian 
assistance, negotiating humanitarian access with these armed groups has become 
integral to the work of humanitarian agencies.”295  
 
To sum up, especially because of these situations, the above-mentioned approach 
perceiving non-state actors as bound by relevant IHL norms through their position as 
subjects ‘sui generis’ seems to be the most realistic and acceptable one, although not being 
literally mentioned by the Geneva Convention and the APs. Once being bound by IHL 
rule applicable in NIACs, the non-state actors are also bound by the obligation to allow 
and facilitate humanitarian assistance subject to their consent, and the providers of the 
assistance need to sough the consent from both the State and the relevant non-state actors.  
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8. Facilitation of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
8.1 Material Scope of Humanitarian Assistance 
 
 Regarding the material scope of humanitarian assistance, “there is no generally 
accepted agreement regarding the extent of humanitarian assistance, that is, the range of 
items and services.”296  
 
 When looking at relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention IV, the AP I, and 
the AP II, it is obvious that there are differences in the specifications of which items and 
services should be provided. However, as will be demonstrated, the lists of items and 
services given by these provisions are, usually, of a demonstrative character, not 
exhaustive. 
 
 Art 23 of the Geneva Convention IV mentions “consignments of medical and 
hospital stores and objects necessary for religious worship” which should be intended 
only for the civilians of another High Contracting Party. Regarding children under fifteen, 
expectant mothers and maternity cases, the list is more extensive; encompassing also 
essential foodstuff, clothing and tonics.  
 
Nevertheless, Art 70 in connection with Art 69 of the AP I broadens this list and 
removes the distinction between children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity 
cases on one hand, and the rest of the civilian population on the other hand. Also, as was 
mentioned above, the list of items and services is more extensive, encompassing besides 
foodstuff and medical supplies also “clothing, bedding, means of shelter, [and] other 
supplies essential to the survival of civilian population.”297 It is important to add that 
according to the Rule 55 of the ICRC Study, this broadening is generally accepted, 
including by States which are not a party to the AP I.298 
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 Regarding the occupied territories, there is no significant difference between the 
items and services listed by Art 59 of the Geneva Convention IV and Art 69 of the AP I 
which is given also by the fact that the lists of the provisions are of a demonstrative 
character both mentioning foodstuff, medical supplies and clothing for all the population 
of the occupied territory. 
 
 As far as the situations of NIACs are concerned, Art 18 of the AP II. speaks about 
“supplies essential for its [the civilian population] survival, such as foodstuff and medical 
supplies.”299 
 
 Thus, as can be noticed, the main emphasis is given on foodstuff, medical supplies, 
and clothes. However, due to the fact that the provisions (with the exception of Art 23 of 
the Geneva Convention[IV]) are not of an exhaustive character, the scope of the items 
and services which can be, potentially, provided by humanitarian assistance is much 
broader. Of course, nothing prevents the parties to the conflict from arranging an 
agreement which would extend the scope of the items. For example, in the situations of 
NIACs, also to those which go beyond the ‘mere’ survival of the civilian population. This 
was the case of the Memorandum of Understanding which was concluded between Iraq 
and the United Nations regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish 
population. The assistance provided included, in addition, also agricultural rehabilitation 
and ‘any humanitarian measures geared to the speedy normalization of life’.300 
 
 With this being said, it is necessary to recall that for humanitarian assistance to 
remain humanitarian assistance, it has to stay in accordance with the principles of 
humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. Thus, also the items and services provided through 
the particular humanitarian action need to be in accordance with these principles. As the 
aim of humanitarian assistance is to bring the help to civilians, it is logical that the 
consignment has to correspond with the humanitarian purpose of the action. That is to say 
that consignments which would contain, for example, weapons or military equipment 
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would be in clear violation of the above mentioned principles and they could not be 
perceive as a ‘humanitarian assistance’. 
 
8.2 Facilitation of Free Passage 
 
Access to humanitarian assistance and the issue of free passage remain a 
significant challenge.301 Even when the consent for a humanitarian action was formally 
granted, States (or armed groups) may use additional bureaucratic tactics to obstruct or 
complicate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.302 In some instances the access of 
humanitarian organizations and the free passage of the aid is hampered by difficulties in 
obtaining visas or import authorizations for the consignment. When addressing the 
complicated situation of the providers of humanitarian assistance in Darfur in 2006, the 
OCHA in its statement on the issue pointed out especially the complex array of 
bureaucratic restrictions. The visa regime for humanitarian workers was complicated and 
lengthy (including the exit visas). Also, humanitarian workers were required to obtain 
permits for travels between states within Darfur and even a special permit to travel to 
particular areas within the states.303 
 
Sometimes logistical issues occur; essential infrastructure has been destroyed or 
damaged making it difficult to reach the affected population 304  The ability of 
humanitarian agencies to carry out humanitarian assistance is often restricted by illegal 
checkpoints, roadblocks and extortion by local authorities and armed groups.305 In August 
2008, the UN reported that there were at least 325 roadblocks through Somalia. Most of 
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them were installed by local armed groups or clan militia and almost all of them 
demanded a payment of fees for granting of free passage.306 
 
8.2.1 International Armed Conflicts  
 
According to Art 23 of the Geneva Convention IV, “[e]ach High Contracting 
Party shall allow the free passage” of the items enlisted in the provision. Nevertheless, 
the impact of the first paragraph of the article is significantly reduced by “the safeguards 
for the benefit of the blocking party… that aim to ensure the consignments are only used 
for the identified humanitarian purposes.”307 Therefore, States are not required to allow 
the free passage of the consignments if there are “serious reasons for fearing:  
 
(a) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination, 
(b) that the control may not be effective, or 
(c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the 
enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned consignments for goods 
which would otherwise be provided or produced by the enemy or through the 
release of such material, services or facilities as would otherwise be required 
for the production of such goods.”308 
  
 However, Art 23 of the Geneva Convention IV needs to be read in the light of 
Art 70 of the AP I.309 According to the second paragraph of this provision “The Parties 
to the conflict and each High Contracting Party shall allow and facilitate rapid and 
unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel provided in 
accordance with this Section [Section II.: Relief in Favour of the Civilian Population], 
even if such assistance is destined for the civilian population of the adverse party.” Art 68 
of the AP I specifically notes that the provisions of the AP I with regard to humanitarian 
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assistance are supplementary to Art 23 of the Geneva Convention IV. Thus, the AP I 
removes the exceptions to the obligation of free passage contained in Art 23 and other 
relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention.310 This clearly indicates that “the rules 
contained in the AP I on this issue develop the rules in the Geneva Convention by 
extending the protections in the latter and removing the restrictions on those 
protections.”311 On the other hand, the AP I establishes the rights of the concerned parties 
to require certain guarantees to balance the obligation to allow and facilitate free 
passage.312 Before moving to these guarantees, it is necessary to note that according to 
the Rule 55 of the ICRC Study, the obligation to allow rapid and unimpeded passage of 
humanitarian assistance is a part of the international customary law.313 Thus, it is binding 
even for those States which have not ratified the AP I. 
 
 The obligation to ‘allow’ humanitarian assistance is not limited merely to a passive 
attitude. Meaning, that it does require from the High Contracting Parties more than a 
restrain from creating obstacles. 314  It entails also an obligation to actively facilitate 
humanitarian assistance. Thus, the parties are obliged to take positive action in order to 
facilitate transport and distribution of humanitarian consignments.315 Similarly, the High 
Contracting Parties are obliged to avoid any harassment, to reduce formalities as far as 
possible and dispense with any that are superfluous.316 On the other hand, although the 
High Contracting Parties must do all they can to facilitate the passage of humanitarian 
assistance, no one is expected to do impossible. It is always necessary to take into account 
the individual situation and conditions.317 
 
 As was mentioned above, the AP I provides the relevant States with the right to 
require certain guarantees. Fist, Art 70 of the AP I provides them with the right “to 
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prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, under which such passage is 
permitted.” It is only logical that the relevant State should have the right to actually check, 
whether the consignment which was labelled as ‘humanitarian’ truly has such character 
and does not contain, for example, weapons or military equipment. 
 
Secondly, the relevant State may insist that the distribution of the humanitarian 
assistance will be made under the local supervision of a Protecting Power.318 According 
to Art 2 of the AP I and the ICRC Study, “[a] Protecting Power is a neutral State or other 
State not a Party to the conflict which has been designated by a Party to the conflict and 
accepted by the enemy Party and has agreed to carry out the functions assigned to a 
Protecting Power under international humanitarian law.” 319 In the reality the institute 
of Protecting Power has not been used in practice for many years. Instead, “the 
International Committee of the Red Cross has come to be recognized as a substitute for 
the Protecting Power.”320 The Commentary to the APs emphasized the importance of this 
right to demand reliable supervision stating that it is of paramount importance especially 
“as the range of relief consignments permitted is far broader than it was under the 
provisions of the Fourth Convention. In fact, if relief, such as, for example, foodstuffs or 
tents, were to end up in the hands of the armed forces, the relief action would undoubtedly 
increase the military potential of the receiving Party and would be obviously 
unacceptable to the adverse Party which had allowed the passage of these goods.”321 
 
 Thirdly, the humanitarian consignment cannot be diverted from the purpose for 
which it was intended and its forwarding cannot be delayed with the exception of cases 
of urgent necessity in the interest of the civilian population concerned.322 According to 
the Commentary to the APs, the case of urgent necessity means that it must be virtually 
impossible to do otherwise.323 A delay could be acceptable, for example, due to security 
reasons; when it would be too dangerous to enter the particular territory. 
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8.2.1.1 Occupied Territories 
 
 Regarding the situation of occupied territories, the obligation of the occupying 
authorities to facilitate humanitarian assistance is, under Art 59 of the Geneva 
Convention IV, unconditional.324 
 
Also, the obligation to authorize the free passage of the consignments is 
accompanied by the obligation to guarantee their protection. Thus, for example, a mere 
lift of a blockade and a refrain from attacking or confiscating the humanitarian 
consignments would not be sufficient. The relevant High Contracting Parties have to 
actively pursue the protection and unimpeded facilitation of the humanitarian 
assistance.325 The Occupying Power is forbidden to divert the consignments from the 
purpose for which they are intended; with the exception of the cases of urgent necessity.326 
Also, the consignments “shall be exempt in occupied territory from all charges, taxes, or 
custom duties unless these are necessary in the interest of the economy of the territory.”327 
 
 However, similarly to the case of Art 70 of the AP I in the context of non-occupied 
territories, the Geneva Convention IV provides the occupying authorities with certain 
control rights. Under Art 59 of the Convention, the Power granting free passage to 
consignments on their way to territory occupied by an adverse Party to the conflict has 
the right to search the consignments, to regulate their passage according to prescribed 
times and routes, and to be reasonably satisfied through the Protecting Power that these 
consignments will be used for the benefit of the needy population, not the Occupying 
Power.328 According to Pictet, such a satisfactory supervision might entail, for example, 
that the relief supplies must reach the people for whom they are intended and that every 
                                                 
(n 127) p 862. 
324 International Legal Frameworks for Humanitarian Action. GSDRC. Topic Guide. Birmingham: 
University of Birmingham, 2013, p 7. 
325 Treaties, State Parties and Commentaries: Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. Commentary. ICRC. 
<https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=15B5740DF
2203BE4C12563CD0042C966> accessed 21 June 2016. 
326 Fourth Geneva Convention (n 6) Art 60. 
327 Fourth Geneva Convention (n 6) Art 61. 




precaution must be taken to ensure that the recipients do not place them on the black 
markets (e.g.: frequent spot checking in storehouse, constant surveillance of the 
distribution or verification of the reports drawn up by the distributing bodies).329  
 
8.2.2 Non-International Armed Conflicts 
 
Contrary to the Geneva Convention IV and the AP I, the provisions of the AP II 
do not specifically contain the obligation to allow and facilitate passage of humanitarian 
assistance and access to it. It is worth to mention that such an obligation was included in 
the draft version of the protocol adopted by Committee II of the Diplomatic Conference 
which led the adoption of the Additional Protocols. However, it was deleted at the last 
moment as a part of the package aimed at the adoption of a simplified text.330 Thus, as far 
as only the treaty law is concerned, there is no such obligation literary mentioned in the 
text of the AP II. There are scholars who claim that it can be argued that the obligation 
can be derived from the spirit of Art 18 of the AP II.331 This approach is also supported 
by the Commentary to the AP II which simply, without any further elaboration, notes that 
“[o]nce relief actions are accepted in principle, the authorities are under obligation to 
co-operate, in particular by facilitation the rapid transit of relief consignments and by 
ensuring the safety of the convoy.”332 
 
As far as the customary law is concerned, according to the ICRC Study and some 
scholars, there is enough state practice and opinion juris to support the claim that there is 
an obligation to facilitate free passage and rapid distribution of humanitarian assistance 
which emerged as a norm of customary international law.333 According to the ICRC, the 
obligation to allow the free passage of relief supplies is set forth in numerous military 
manuals which are applicable in non-international armed conflicts, it is also supported by 
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many official statements and other practice relating to non-international armed conflicts, 
and the contrary practice has generally been condemned with respect to both international 
and non-international armed conflict. 334  The ICRC mentions, as an example, the 
Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. The regime reportedly used the denial of access to food as 
a weapon against armed opposition groups, including by banning the movement of relief 
supplies after a famine emerged in late 1989. However, there was a strong international 
criticism of this policy and Mengistu reversed his decision. There are also numerous 
condemning statements made by the UN Security Council, which has called on the parties 
to numerous conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan, Angola, between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Georgia, Kosovo, Liberia, Somalia and Yemen to provide unimpeded access for 
humanitarian assistance.335 Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are scholars who 
still question whether there the state practice is truly strong enough to create the obligation 
to free passage also under international customary law.336 
  
8.3 Obligations of Third States 
 
 The cooperation of third States is essential for successful transit and delivery of 
humanitarian consignments. In many cases the access to the civilian population in need 
is possible only through the territory of another State.337 Therefore, a guarantee of free 
passage granted only by the receiving party would not be sufficient.  
 
 According to Art 23 of the Geneva Convention IV, “[e]ach High Contracting 
Party shall allow the free passage of all consignments…”338 By using the phrase ‘each 
High Contracting Party’ the provision addresses not only the parties to the conflict, but 
also other High Contracting Parties to the Convention. Thus, it imposes the obligation to 
allow free passage also upon all relevant third States.339 The obligations of third States in 
the context of occupied territories are regulated in the same way. According to Art 59 of 
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the Geneva Convention IV, “[a]ll Contracting Parties shall permit the free passage of 
these [for the civilian population of the occupied territory intended] consignments and 
shall guarantee their protection.”  
 
Similarly, Art 70 of the AP I, which supplements the relevant provisions of the 
Geneva Convention IV, explicitly highlights the obligation of third states stating that 
“[t]he Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party concerned shall allow and 
facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and 
personnel provided in accordance with this Section…”340 It should be noted that as in the 
case of the parties to the conflict, the third states obligation to allow the free passage of 
humanitarian assistance is accompanied by the obligation to guarantee its protection.341 
Also, as the parties to the conflict, the third States allowing the humanitarian assistance 
to pass through their territory have the rights according to Art 70 para 3. These encompass, 
for example, the right to search the consignments, prescribe technical arrangements, and 
request the supervision of a Protecting Power or its substitute. 
 
Regarding NIACs, the AP II does not expressly address the obligations of third 
states in the context of free passage and facilitation of humanitarian assistance. There was 
a provision in the draft of the AP II containing such an obligation, however it was deleted 
before the adoption of the protocol in order to simplify its text.342 Thus, Art 18 of the AP 
II does not contain any provision addressing third states. Theoretically, it could be 
possible to use the same approach, using the ‘spirit of the Art 18’ argument, as in the case 
of the obligation to allow and facilitate the free passage. However, interestingly, it seems 
that, contrary to the above-mentioned obligation of the parties to the conflict, there is not 
enough support among the doctrine to actually make such a claim. Majority of the 
available literature as well as the Commentary to the AP II simply avoid the issue. 
 
As far as customary international law is concerned, the ICRC Study does not 
declare that there is such an obligation created as a part of customary international law.343 
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It refers to some instances when the UN SC called upon the neighbouring states to help 
with the transfer and facilitation of humanitarian assistance. For example, in 1994, the 
UN SC called upon the neighbouring states of Rwanda to facilitate the goods and supplies 
to meet the needs of the displaced persons within Rwanda.344 The ICRC Study also 
mentions the Guiding Principles on Humanitarian Assistance (‘the Guiding Principles’) 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1991 which emphasize that “States in proximity 
to emergencies are urged to participate closely with the affected countries in international 
efforts, with a view to facilitating, to the extent possible, the transit of humanitarian 
assistance.”345 Here, it is important to notice the choice of the words as the Guiding 
Principles states that States are ‘urged’ to participate, not ‘obliged’. The Guiding 
Principles as well as the above-mentioned UN SC resolution calls upon the third States, 
urge them. Nevertheless, they do not state that the third States actually have the obligation 
to do so. 
 
8.4 Protection of Humanitarian Personnel 
 
 There has been a raising concern regarding the safety and protection of 
humanitarian personnel during the last three decades. The job of humanitarian personnel 
has never been considered an easy one, however, it has become particularly dangerous 
since the 90’s. For example, regarding the UN personnel, during the years 1973 – 1991 
approximately 20 UN staff members in total were killed in the course of carrying out their 
duties. In 2008 there were 146 incidents directly involving humanitarian personnel only 
in Somalia which led to 36 humanitarian staff being killed and 17 injured.346 According 
to OCHA, more humanitarian workers were attacked in 2013 than in any years since 1997 
when the record keeping began.347 In 2013 around 340 aid workers were attacked and 119 
killed. The year before, in 2012, it was 276 attacked humanitarian workers, of whom 69 
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were killed.348 In June 2015, nine Afghan employees of the Czech NGO People in Need 
were attacked and deliberately killed by an unidentified gunman in Northern Afghanistan.  
 
 However, it cannot be said that the above-mentioned alarming development has 
its roots in the lack of protection of humanitarian personnel as far as IHL is concerned. 
Protection of civilians and humanitarian personnel is strongly enshrined in IHL. 
The ICRC goes even as far as describing the protection of civilians during armed conflicts 
as a cornerstone of IHL.349 The main problem, in this case, is not the law, but the lack of 
respect for it. “The protection of civilians provided by the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols is extensive. ’The problem of the past 50 years has been the 
application. Neither States nor non-State armed groups have respected their obligations 
adequately.”350 
 
On the general level, civilian personnel involved in humanitarian assistance are 
subject to the general protections applicable to civilians of states not party to the 
conflict. 351  Nevertheless, IHL grants the humanitarian relief personnel also with 
additional protection in both IACs and NIACs. 
 
Regarding the IACs, the Geneva Convention IV does not contain a provision 
which would expressly grant the humanitarian relief personnel a special protection. 
However, according to the Commentary, the obligation to allow free passage of relief 
consignments to and within the occupied territories under Art 59 “is accompanied by the 
obligation to guarantee their protection.... all the States concerned must respect the 
consignments and protect them when they are exposed to danger through military 
operations.”352 The Geneva Convention IV was further supplemented by the AP I. Art 71 
of the AP I provides: 
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“1. Where necessary, relief personnel may form part of the assistance provided in 
any relief action, in particular for the transportation and distribution of relief 
consignments; the participation of such personnel shall be subject to the 
approval of the Party in whose territory they will carry out their duties. 
2. Such personnel shall be respected and protected.”353 
  
 The obligation to protect and respect the humanitarian relief personnel stated in 
para 2 of the provision applies to all Parties to the conflict. 354  According to the 
Commentary to the AP I, one of the components of the above-mentioned obligation is, 
for example, the obligation of the Parties to the conflict to inform and instruct their armed 
forces not to attack the humanitarian relief personnel.355 
  
In this context, the Commentary to the AP I also highlights the importance and 
usefulness of the protective Red Cross, Red Crescent, and Red Crystal emblems.356 The 
purpose of these emblems is to serve as an identification and protection of humanitarian 
objects such as hospitals, medical transports, and also the convoys with humanitarian 
assistance and humanitarian relief personnel. The use of the protective emblems is 
governed by the Geneva Conventions and the APs.357 However, not all providers of 
humanitarian assistance are in the position to display the protective emblems. Only 
the ICRC, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, National 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and in certain situations also by the medical 
services of armed forces, military chaplains and civilian hospitals in the situations of 
armed conflict, are authorized to use them.358  
 
 Regarding the NIACs, contrary to the AP I, the AP II does not contain a specific 
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provision dealing with the protection of humanitarian relief personnel. Nevertheless, 
according to the ICRC Study “This rule [the obligation to protect humanitarian relief 
personnel] is indispensable… if relief actions for civilian populations in need are to 
succeed.”359 
 
 Although the treaty law does not provide specific or elaborated provisions 
confirming the obligation to respect and protect the humanitarian relief personnel during 
the NIACs, there is a strong foundation of such an obligation in customary international 
law regarding both IACs and NIACs.360 
 
The rule 31 of the ICRC Study clearly states that “[h]umanitarian relief personnel 
has to be protected and respected’.361 According to the study, ‘[s]tate practice establishes 
this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and 
non-international armed conflicts. The safety and security of humanitarian relief 
personnel is an indispensable condition for the delivery of humanitarian relief to civilian 
populations in need threatened with starvation.”362 The study also refers to numerous 
cases confirming the state practice.363 It can be said that virtually every attack against 
humanitarian relief personnel meets with a strong condemnation by the international 
community and actors. There is a long list of UN SC resolutions condemning attacks 
against humanitarian relief personnel no matter the type of conflicts.364 For example, in a 
resolution adopted in 2003 on the ‘Protection of United Nations personnel, associated 
personnel and humanitarian personnel in conflict zones’, the UN SC unanimously 
expressed “its strong condemnation of all forms of violence, including, inter alia, murder, 
rape and sexual assault, intimidation, armed robbery, abduction, hostage-taking, 
kidnapping, harassment and illegal arrest and detention to which those participating in 
humanitarian operations are increasingly exposed, as well as attacks on humanitarian 
convoys and acts of destruction and looting of their property.”365 Similarly, in a resolution 
                                                 










adopted in 2006 on the situation in Georgia, the UN Security Council underlined “that it 
is the primary responsibility of both sides to provide appropriate security and to ensure 
the freedom of movement of UNOMIG, the CIS peacekeeping force and other 
international personnel’ and called ‘on both sides to fulfil their obligations in this 
regard.”366 
 
It should be noted that deliberate attacking of humanitarian relief personnel is 
considered to be a war crime, under the Rome Statute of the ICC. Pursuant to Art 
8(2)(b)(iii) and (e)(iii), “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against personnel … involved 
in a humanitarian assistance … mission … as long as they are entitled to the protection 
given to civilians … under the international law of armed conflict” constitutes a war 
crime in both international and non-international armed conflicts.367 
 
To sum up, it is clear that the protection of humanitarian relief personnel is at the 
centre of attention of IHL which, at least on the theoretical level, provides humanitarian 
relief personnel with a strong and, as far as they act in accordance with their position, 
unconditional protection. Unfortunately, as was mentioned at the beginning of this 
sub-chapter, the reality in the field does not reflect the legal framework as hundreds of 
humanitarian workers are attacked every year. 
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 As was stated in the introduction to this thesis, there are thousands of people 
seeking humanitarian assistance around the world and there are also thousands of those 
who are trying to provide them with it. Unfortunately, both sides face serious obstacles. 
These obstacles have their roots in different reasons. 
 
 Some of them are caused by the imperfect legal framework governing 
humanitarian assistance in situations of armed conflicts. As was demonstrated, the 
majority of problems with the interpretation or application of various legal rules is 
connected with NIACs as the legal framework dealing with them is not so rich as the one 
dedicated to IACs. There are many issues missing in the treaty law governing NIACs. In 
order to make the AP II acceptable for as many States as possible, numerous important 
provision were deleted from the draft version leaving issues like facilitation and its exact 
conditions unanswered. Of course, it can be argued that those can be governed by 
customary IHL. To put in another words; if there is a need for more rules or more exact 
rules, they can be always created through state practice and opinio juris. Unfortunately, 
as was also discussed in this thesis, the customary character of numerous IHL rules is 
disputable and it is not a simply task to determine which rules can be perceived as 
customary and which not. Moreover, it is easier for a State to dispute the existence of a 
legal rule, when it exists only as a part of the customary IHL. Once written and ratified 
treaty provision cannot be questioned so easily. 
 
 One of the most problematic, on the theoretical and also practical level, is the issue 
of consent. Once again, the legal framework, while creating the obligation to seek consent 
for humanitarian assistance from parties to the conflict, does not specify in a great detail 
under which circumstances can be such consent denied. There are no details provided by 
the treaty law. There are, presumably, some more specific rules which has emerged 
through customary IHL. However, those are still not specific enough. Although it is 
generally accepted that the denial of consent cannot be arbitrary, the exact meaning of 
‘arbitrary’ is unclear. Moreover, there are also disputes regarding from whom the consent 





 Although problematic, there is a positive aspect of those kind of problems which 
are related to the imperfections of the legal framework: they can be fixed through an 
adoption of new legal instruments or through creating of new and strong IHL customary 
rules; under the condition that there is a political will to do so. However, there are also 
situations when the problem is not caused by the mere legal rules, but by the lack of 
respect towards them.    
 
 In some cases, the already existing rules are abused by the parties to the armed 
conflict. For example, when allowing humanitarian assistance to be deliver to a certain 
area, the parties are obliged to ensure its protection. However, sometimes this obligation 
is used as an excuse for refusing the providers of humanitarian assistance to enter 
particular area; based on the argument that it is too dangerous.368 
 
 Some provisions regarding humanitarian assistance are simply not respected 
enough. As discussed in Chapter VIII., IHL provides humanitarian relief personnel and 
convoys with a strong protection. Still, these provisions are one of the most violated. 
Similarly, parties to the conflict should allow free and unimpeded passage of humanitarian 
assistance. In reality, the providers have to pay fees and bribe to cross various roadblocks 
and ‘‘checkpoints’’. The ways how to “fix” these problems are more connected with the 
issue of enforcement of IHL and consequences of its violations. Unfortunately, although 
being highly interesting, the scope of this thesis was too limited to deal with such complex 
issues. However, it would be a great topic for another thesis or dissertation. 
 
 Finally, there are also some basic misunderstandings regarding the character of 
humanitarian assistance among the public and sometimes even among the parties to the 
conflict. As mentioned in Chapter VI., the concept of humanitarian assistance under IHL 
is based on principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality, and it also has to be 
facilitated in such way. Nevertheless, providers of humanitarian assistance sometimes 
face criticism for helping the “wrong” people, meaning the people who are by some part 
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of the public perceived as morally “bad”. These situations can be prevented only by 
education on the topic and by raising the awareness about IHL and humanitarian 
assistance. 
 
 Going once again back to the introduction part of this thesis, the history of the 
human effort to help those suffering in violent conflicts and wars is probably as old as the 
wars and violent conflicts themselves. As long as humanity will fight, there will be people 
trying to help the victims and there will be also parties to the conflicts trying to prevent 
any negative consequences which such help could have for their interests. The IHL has 
to and needs to balance all these interests which is not an easy and uncomplicated task. 
The current legal framework governing humanitarian assistance in armed conflicts 
mirrors this. There is certainly a way to bring more legal certainty into the already existing 
rules and there is also a space for new ones. There is also definitely a space for more 
respect towards IHL. On the other hand, the progress which has been made in this field 







Diplomová práce se zabývá problematikou humanitární pomoci tak, jak je upravena 
normami platného mezinárodního humanitárního práva.  
 
Pojem humanitární pomoc 
 
Jelikož v rámci platných právních instrumentů mezinárodního práva i v rámci 
doktríny samotné neexistuje jednotná definice pojmu „humanitární pomoc“, bylo nejdříve 
nezbytné tento pojem, pro účely této diplomové práce, vymezit.   
 
 Pro účely této práce bylo stanoveno, že pod pojem humanitární pomoc nebudou 
spadat následující instituty: rozvojová pomoc, pomoc v situacích živelných pohrom a 
jiných katastrof a humanitární intervence. Rozvojová pomoc byla vyloučena z toho 
důvodu, že jejím primárním cílem není poskytování pomoci obětem ozbrojených 
konfliktů, nýbrž, jak již název sám napovídá, dlouhodobý ekonomický, sociální a 
politický rozvoj.369 Pomoc poskytovaná v situacích živelných pohrom a jiných katastrof 
je pro účely této práce tématem příliš širokým, neboť mimo ozbrojené konflikty zahrnuje 
i řadu dalších událostí. Koncept humanitární intervence byl taktéž odlišen od pojmu 
„humanitární pomoc“, a to z toho důvodu, že dle většiny doktríny v sobě zahrnuje prvek 
donucení v podobě hrozby silou či užití síly a nevyžaduje souhlas dotčeného státu370 .  
Takovýto přístup je ovšem v rozporu s tím, jak institut humanitární pomoci vnímají 
Ženevské úmluvy či různí mezinárodní aktéři.371 Za „humanitární pomoc“, pro účely této 
diplomové práce, tak byly označeny takové akce, jejichž cílem je poskytnutí základních 
a nezbytných zásob a služeb civilnímu obyvatelstvu, které se nachází v situaci 
ozbrojeného konfliktu, a to ať již vnitrostátními nebo zahraničními aktéry. Zároveň bylo 
určeno, že přestože hlavním pojmem používaným pro účely této práce bude pojem 
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„humanitární pomoc“, termíny jako „humanitární akce“ či „pomocné akce“372 budou také 
využívány, a to jakožto synonyma. 
 
Představená definice má svá omezení, jichž si je autorka plně vědoma. Ty jsou dány 
především limitem práce samotné, neboť vzhledem k jejímu omezenému rozsahu není 
možné zkoumat všechny existující způsoby, na základě kterých lze k pojmu „humanitární 
pomoc“ přistoupit. Bylo tedy zapotřebí zvolit jeden a zbylé vyloučit. 
 
Relevantní právní prameny 
 
Hlavními právními prameny, které upravují institut humanitární pomoci v rámci 
mezinárodního humanitárního práva (dále jen „MHP“), jsou Čtvrtá ženevská úmluva 
z roku 1949 – Úmluva o ochraně civilních osob za války (dále jen „Čtvrtá ženevská 
úmluva“), Dodatkový protokol I a Dodatkový protokol II.373  
 
Nejdříve je nicméně zapotřebí stručně představit Haagskou úmluvu o zákonech a 
obyčejích pozemní války,374 která byla přijata na  první Haagské mírové konferenci v roce 
1899. Tato úmluva je důležitou z toho důvodu, že byla prvním mezinárodním právně 
závazným instrumentem, který, byť jen ve velmi obecné rovině, obsahoval pravidla 
týkající se postavení civilních osob a zacházení s nimi za války. Úmluva z roku 1899 byla 
s mírnými změnami revidována v roce 1907 na druhé Haagské mírové konferenci. Byť 
od přijetí těchto dokumentů uplynulo více než sto let, některé jejich části jsou nadále 
platnou součástí humanitárního práva, neboť jsou vyjádřením mezinárodního 
obyčejového práva.375  
 
Byla to nicméně až výše uvedená Čtvrtá ženevská úmluva z roku 1949, která byla 
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prvním mezinárodním smluvním instrumentem věnovaným výhradně otázce postavení, 
práv a ochrany civilistů v rámci ozbrojených konfliktů. Všechny čtyři ženevské úmluvy 
z roku 1949 byly následně roku 1977 doplněny o dva dodatkové protokoly. Tedy, o 
Dodatkový protokol I., který řeší právní úpravu mezinárodních ozbrojených konfliktů, a 
Dodatkový protokol II., který se věnuje problematice konfliktů vnitrostátních. Před 
přijetím Dodatkového protokolu II. upravoval, v rámci smluvního práva, situace 
vnitrostátních konfliktů pouze společný čl. 3 Ženevských úmluv z roku 1949. 
 
Závěrem je nezbytné zmínit i Římský statut Mezinárodního trestního soudu (dále 
jen „Římský status“),376 který byl přijat na mezinárodní diplomatické konferenci v Římě 
v roce 1998 a vstoupil v platnost 1. července 2002. Římský statut upravuje fungování a 
jurisdikci Mezinárodního trestního soudu (dále jen „MSD“) a zároveň stanovuje čtyři 
kategorie mezinárodních zločinů, které MSD může na základě individuální trestní 
odpovědnosti jednotlivců stíhat – zločin genocidia, válečné zločiny, zločiny proti lidskosti 
a zločin agrese. Římský status je pro problematiku humanitární pomoci důležitý z toho 
důvod, neboť dvě ze skutkových podstat, které zavádí, se dotýkají právě i humanitární 
pomoci. Čl. 8 odst. 2 písm. b)  Římského statutu označuje úmyslné hladovění civilistů 
jakožto způsob vedení mezinárodních ozbrojených konfliktů za válečný zločin. Zde je 
nutné podotknout, že Římský státu neobsahuje obdobné pravidlo i pro situace 
vnitrostátních konfliktů. Dalším pro účely této práce relevantním válečným zločinem, 
jehož skutkovou podstatu Římský statut vymezuje, a to v čl. 8 odst. 2 písm. d), je úmyslné 
napadání pracovníků, jednotek, objektů či vozidel, kteří jsou součástí humanitární pomoci 
či operací na udržení míru. 
 
Co se týče mezinárodního obyčejového práva, ke vzniku obyčejové právní normy 
jsou nezbytné dva faktory – praxe států (usus) a  přesvědčení o právní závaznosti 
takovéhoto pravidla (opinio juris). 377  U výše uvedených Ženevských úmluv panuje 
obecná shoda, že mají svůj odraz i v rámci mezinárodního obyčejového práva. Tedy, že 
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normy obsažené v těchto úmluvách jsou i normami mezinárodního obyčejového práva.378 
Obyčejový charakter norem obsažených v Dodatkovém protokolu I. a Dodatkovém 
protokolu II. je diskutabilní.379 Vzhledem k tomu, že určení toho, jaké normy jsou či 
nejsou normami obyčejového MHP, je poměrně komplikované, rozhodl se v roce 1997 
Mezinárodní výbor Červeného kříže na toto téma vypracovat obsáhlou studii o 
obyčejovém mezinárodním humanitárním právu (dále jen „studie MVČK“).380 Ta spatřila 
světlo světa v roce 2005 a dělí se na dvě části – pravidla a k nim náležící praxi. Přestože 
se způsob vypracování studie i její závěry nevyhnuly kritice, například ze strany 
Spojených států amerických, je obecně považována za věrohodný a kvalitní, byť právně 
nezávazný, materiál. Je nicméně nutné brát ohled na to, že studie byla obecně kritizována 
především pro přílišnou progresivitu – tedy proto, že za mezinárodní obyčej označuje i 
taková pravidla, která dle jiných aktérů tohoto statusu ještě nedosáhla.381 
 
Stručná historie humanitární pomoci 
 
Přestože základy moderního MHP byly položeny až v 19. století, kořeny 
humanitární pomoci jakožto snahy pomoci obětem válek či ozbrojených konfliktů sahají 
daleko hlouběji do historie – pravděpodobně stejně daleko jakožto existence násilných 
střetů samotných. Pravidla řídící tyto „akty pomoci“ byla ovšem jiného charakteru než 
dnes, neboť nebyla založena na mezinárodních smluvních či obyčejových právních 
normách, ale na náboženských pravidlech, popř. na tzv. kodexech cti, jimiž se bojovníci 
dané kultury měli řídit. Tato pravidla se měnila v závislosti na kultuře a časovém období 
a ne vždy přistupovala ke všem jednotlivcům stejně – například příslušníci jiné 
náboženské víry byli nezřídka v méně výhodném postavení. 
 
Hlavním impulsem ke vzniku moderního MHP byla iniciativa švýcarského 
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obchodníka Henryho Dunanta, aktivisty a později také nositele první Nobelovy ceny míru. 
Ten se poté, co se stal svědkem následků bitvy u Solferina v červnu 1859, podílel jak na 
založení „Výboru Pěti“, z kterého následně vznikl dnešní Mezinárodní výbor Červeného 
kříže, tak na zorganizování diplomatické konference v roce 1864, která vedla k přijetí 
první Ženevské úmluvy, plným názvem Ženevské úmluvy o zlepšení osudu raněných a 
nemocných příslušníků ozbrojených sil v poli 382  Je zapotřebí zmínit, že první 
mezinárodní úmluvy upravující humanitární právo přijaté po roce 1864 nevěnovaly 
postavení a ochraně civilistů, a tím pádem i otázce humanitární pomoci, příliš mnoho 
pozornosti.  
 
První mezinárodní úmluvou věnovanou výhradně civilistům byla až Čtvrtá 
ženevská úmluva, Úmluva o ochraně civilních osob za války, která byla přijata v roce 
1949. Politické mocnosti 19. století totiž operovaly s premisou, že války jsou bojovány 
vojáky a armádami a civilního obyvatelstva se tudíž tolik nedotýkají. První světová válka 
byla rychlým a nepříjemným probuzením z této představy. Bohužel, přijetí návrhu 
mezinárodní úmluvy zaměřené právě na ochranu civilistů, který v meziválečných letech 
předložil Mezinárodní výbor Červeného kříže, zabránil začátek II. světové války v roce 
1939.383  Jedním z hlavních problémů, s kterými se civilní obyvatelstvo během obou 
světových válek potýkalo, byl právě nedostatek základní surovin a omezený přístup 
k humanitární pomoci – i z toho důvodu, že úmyslné hladovění civilního obyvatelstva 
jakožto způsobu vedení války nebylo v té době ještě zakázané.384 Stejně tak neexistovala 
všeobecně platná smluvní pravidla, která by poskytování humanitární pomoci civilnímu 
obyvatelstvu za války upravovala. Přijetí Čtvrté ženevské úmluvy v roce 1949 tak bylo 
zásadní a významnou změnou. Podrobnější úpravu, i v oblasti humanitární pomoci, pak 
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Podmínky aplikace pravidel mezinárodního humanitárního práva 
upravujících poskytování humanitární pomoci  
 
K tomu, aby bylo možné aplikovat ta pravidla MHP, která upravují otázku 
humanitární pomoci, na určitou konkrétní situaci, je zapotřebí splnění několika podmínek. 
 
Zaprvé – musí se jednat o situaci ozbrojeného konfliktu. Humanitární pomoc, jak 
již bylo uvedeno výše, upravují pravidla MHP. Přestože existuje poměrně malá škála 
norem MHP, které se vztahují i na situace míru (např. povinnost šířit povědomí o MHP), 
pravidla dotýkající se otázky humanitární pomoci jsou aplikovatelná pouze během 
ozbrojených konfliktů. 
 
Zadruhé se musí jednat o situaci, kdy primární aktér, ať již stát či nestátní aktér 
kontrolující danou oblast, není schopný dostatečnou humanitární pomoc poskytnout sám. 
Jak uvádí řada odborníků, komentář k Dodatkovému protokolu II. či například rezoluce 
Valného shromáždění OSN,  subjektem majícím primární postavení při poskytování 
humanitární pomoci je sám dotčený stát. 385  Role různých mezinárodních organizací, 
jiných států či neziskových organizací by měla být vnímána až jako subsidiární a 
doplňující primárního aktéra. Řečeno jinými slovy, v situaci, kdy je daný stát či nestátní 
aktér kontrolující dané území schopný humanitární situaci zvládnout sám, není zapotřebí, 
aby poskytování humanitární pomoci zajišťovaly jiné subjekty.  
  
Třetí podmínkou pro aplikaci ustavení MHP, která se věnují poskytování 
humanitární pomoci, je určitá míra „utrpení“ civilního obyvatelstva. Tato podmínka je 
založena na úvaze, že jedním z přirozených doprovodných jevů ozbrojených konfliktů je 
i negativní dopad na civilní obyvatelstvo. Ne vždy je však tento dopad tak intenzivní a 
zásadní, aby vyžadoval zorganizování humanitární operace. Každý z příslušných 
instrumentů MHP nastavuje „laťku“ různě vysoko. Nejníže ji pokládá čl. 59 Čtvrté 
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ženevské úmluvy pro situaci okupovaných území, který stanoví, že pomocné akce mají 
být podniknuty v případě, kdy je obyvatelstvo obsazeného území nebo jeho části 
„nedostatečně zásobováno“. 386  Podobný požadavek stanoví i čl. 70 Dodatkového 
protokolu I. pro situace mimo okupovaná území. Nejvýše výslovnou „laťku“ nastavuje 
čl. 18 Dodatkového protokolu II. pro situace vnitrostátních konfliktů, který stanoví, že 
obyvatelstvo musí trpět „nadměrnou nouzí v důsledku nedostatku zásob nutných k jeho 
přežití“.387 
 
Příjemci a poskytovatelé humanitární pomoci 
 
Cílem humanitární pomoci je poskytnou pomoc trpícímu civilnímu obyvatelstvu. 
Pro tento účel je ovšem nezbytné stanovit přesný význam slova „civilista“ a „civilní 
obyvatelstvo“. Ženevská úmluva, přestože termíny „civilista“ či „civilní 
obyvatelstvo“ používá, definici těchto pojmů neobsahuje. Příslušnou definici lze nicméně 
nalézt v čl. 50 Dodatkového protokolu I., který za civilisty označuje ty osoby, které nejsou 
kombatanty. Pravidlo č. 5 studie MVČK přistupuje k vymezení civilistů stejně. 388 
V případech, kdy panují pochybnosti o statusu určité osoby, platí presumpce jejího 
civilního statusu - tedy až do prokázání opaku je nutné ji považovat za civilistu a také s ní 
jako s civilistou zacházet. Co se týče vnitrostátních konfliktů, Dodatkový protokol II., 
oproti Dodatkovému protokolu I., neobsahuje definici civilisty či civilních osob. Původní 
návrh protokolu takovouto definici obsahoval, avšak ta byla společně s dalšími 
ustanoveními vymazána ještě před přijetím dokumentu za účelem jeho zjednodušení a 
zkrácení. Chybějící definice je v tomto případě závažným opomenutím, neboť právě ve 
vnitrostátních konfliktech je hranice mezi civilisty a osobami náležícími k ozbrojeným 
silám méně ostrá. Zajímavé je, že komentář k Dodatkovému protokolu II. chybějící 
definici přechází a přímo uvádí, že civilním obyvatelstvem jsou myšleny všechny osoby, 
které se nepodílejí na nepřátelských akcích.389 Co se týče obyčejového MHP, pravidlo 
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č. 5 studie MVČK se dle této studie vztahuje bez rozlišení na mezinárodní i vnitrostátní 
konflikty. 
 
Mezi hlavní skupiny poskytovatelů humanitární pomoci patří následující – státy, 
mezinárodní organizace, MVČK a s ním spřízněné organizace a neziskové organizace 
(dále jen „NGOs“). Státy patří obecně mezi jedny z nejaktivnějších poskytovatelů 
humanitární pomoci, a to přestože bližší pohled do Čtvrté ženevské úmluvy i 
Dodatkových protokolů napoví, že s nimi tyty dokumenty v této roli nepočítaly, neboť je 
ve spojitosti s ní neuvádějí – s výjimkou okupovaných území. Mezinárodní organizace 
jsou rovněž aktivními přispěvateli, a to ať již univerzální – v této kategorii je nejaktivnější 
OSN, nebo regionální. Jejich hlavní výhodou je to, že oproti státům jim hrozí menší 
podezření z toho, že by se mohly prostřednictvím humanitární pomoci snažit prosazovat 
své politické či vojenské zájmy. Na druhou stranu, schválení humanitární pomoci 
většinou vyžaduje podporu většiny členů organizace a ne vždy se pro její zorganizování 
najde dostatečná podpora.  MVČK, Mezinárodní federace Červeného kříže a Červeného 
půlměsíce a národní společnosti Červeného kříže a Červeného měsíce mají v rámci MHP 
i v souvislosti s poskytováním humanitární pomoci tradiční a všeobecně respektovanou 
roli. Čtvrtá ženevská úmluva i Dodatkové protokoly je zároveň často uvádí jako názorný 
příklad organizací, které mohou za daných podmínek humanitární pomoc poskytovat. 
Kromě již uvedených mohou poskytovat humanitární pomoci i jiné organizace, zpravidla 
neziskové a nevládní, tedy tzv. NGOs. Jak již bylo uvedeno, příslušné právní instrumenty 
jejich zapojení nevylučují. Mezi nejznámější organizace tohoto typu patří například 
Lékaři bez hranic nebo OXFAM. 
 
Povaha humanitární pomoci 
  
 Aby bylo možné pomoc poskytovanou v rámci ozbrojeného konfliktu považovat za 
pomoc humanitární tak, jak ji chápe tato práce, musí naplňovat určité parametry. Přesněji 
řečeno – musí se řídit určitými principy. Těmi jsou princip humanity, nestrannosti a 
neutrality.390 Akce, které jsou v rozporu s těmito pravidly, nelze označit za „humanitární 
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pomoc“ ve smyslu MHP a tím pádem se na ně nevztahují ani příslušné právní normy.391 
Tedy ani ochrana a výsady, kterou MHP humanitární pomoci jako takové poskytuje. 
 
 Princip humanity odráží samotný cíl a smysl humanitární asistence – tedy pomoc 
civilnímu obyvatelstvu v nouzi. Humanitární pomoc musí vždy směřovat k tomuto cíli a 
usilovat o něj.392 Musí být tedy vedena ve prospěch trpícího civilního obyvatelstva, ne 
s cílem dosáhnout např. ekonomického či vojenského zisku. 
 
 Princip nestrannosti je založen na zákazu diskriminace a premise, že pomoc má být 
poskytována dle nejvyšší potřeby. Tedy, jediným akceptovatelným faktorem při 
poskytování humanitární pomoci a při její distribuci je  míra potřeby trpící osoby. Vážně 
zranění by měli dostat přednost před méně zraněnými, více hladovějící před méně 
hladovějícími. Ti, kteří trpí více, před těmi, kteří trpí méně. Je ovšem zakázáno činit 
jakékoliv rozdíly na základě rasy, barvy pleti, národnosti, pohlaví, politického smýšlení, 
náboženství či například příslušnosti k určité sociální skupině.393 
 
 Třetím principem je princip neutrality. U tohoto je nezbytné poznamenat, že jej ani 
Ženevské úmluvy, ani Dodatkové protokoly přímo nezmiňují. Dle některých názorů jej 
ovšem lze vyčíst tzv. mezi řádky394 a zmiňuje jej např. rezoluce Valného shromáždění 
OSN č. 46/182 (1991) či charta Lékařů bez hranic395. Zároveň se jedná o jeden z hlavních 
principů Mezinárodního výboru Červeného kříže.396 Dle MacKintoshové se tento princip 
skládá ze dvou hlavních elementů – ideologické neutrality a neúčasti na probíhajících 
bojích.397 Ideologická neutralita neznamená, že by jednotliví poskytovatelé humanitární 
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pomoci nemohli mít politické názory týkající se samotného konfliktu, neměli by je však 
vyjadřovat nahlas a vynášet soudy týkající se důvodu vzniku konfliktu či například 
„viny“ té či oné strany. Druhým elementem je pak nezapojování se do probíhajících bojů, 
a to ať již přímo či nepřímo. Za účast by bylo považováno například převážení zbraní 
patřících jedné ze stran konfliktu, skladování těchto zbraní v zařízeních poskytovatele 
humanitární pomoci, šíření propagandy mezi civilním obyvatelstvem či prozrazování 
strategický informací.398 
 
Souhlas s humanitární pomocí 
 
 S problematikou udělování souhlasu k humanitární akci jsou spojeny dvě hlavní 
otázky – za jakých podmínek má stát či jiný relevantní subjekt povinnost souhlas udělit a 
čí souhlas je vlastně zapotřebí. Odlišná pravidla se uplatňují pro situace vnitrostátních 
ozbrojených konfliktů, mezinárodních ozbrojených konfliktů a případy okupovaných 
území v rámci mezinárodních ozbrojených konfliktů. 
 
 Humanitární pomoc, tak jak ji obecně vnímá MHP a tato diplomová práce, je 
založena na principech humanity, nestrannosti, neutrality a zároveň také respektu 
k suverenitě daného státu. Jak již bylo uvedeno výše, humanitární pomoc je nenásilným 
institutem. Jeho násilné vynucování by bylo v příkrém rozporu s principy, na kterých je 
sám postaven. Podléhá tudíž souhlasu dotčeného státu.399 Na druhou stranu, státy jsou 
vázány svými mezinárodními závazky včetně povinnosti umožnit, za splnění daných 
podmínek, poskytnutí humanitární pomoci trpícímu civilnímu obyvatelstvu. Přestože 
tedy je možné, aby udělení souhlasu k humanitární pomoci odmítly, toto odmítnutí musí 
být dostatečně opodstatněné a rozhodně nesmí být svévolné.400 Odmítnutí souhlasu by 
tak mělo být výjimkou, zatímco jeho udělení pravidlem.401 
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 Důležitou a poměrně komplikovanou otázkou je identita subjektu, jehož souhlas je 
k poskytování humanitární pomoci nezbytný. Zatímco pravidla týkající se mezinárodních 
ozbrojených konfliktů jsou v tomto případě jasná a na jejich výkladu panuje shoda – 
souhlas udělují dotčené státy, v případě vnitrostátních ozbrojených konfliktů je situace 
složitější. Zde totiž vyvstává otázka, zda je zapotřebí i souhlas nestátních aktérů 
zapojených do konfliktu – tedy například ozbrojených opozičních skupin. Příslušné 
smluvní ustanovení, článek 18 Dodatkového protokolu II., uvádí, že je vyžadován souhlas 
„Vysokých smluvních stran“. Komentář k Dodatkovému protokolu II i řada odborníků se 
shodují, že pod toto označení mohou spadat jen státy – jakožto signatáři protokolu, 
nikoliv nestátní aktéři.402 Tento výklad by tedy naznačoval, že se výše uvedený čl. 18 na 
nestátní aktéry nevztahuje. Na druhou stranu, existuje výrazně podporovaný názor, že 
ozbrojené opoziční skupiny jsou vázány normami mezinárodního humanitárního práva, a 
to téměř ve stejném rozsahu jako stát, na jehož území působí.403 Jejich subjektivita je sui 
generis a má funkční povahu, tedy odvíjí se od faktické role, kterou tyto skupiny 
v ozbrojeném konfliktu sehrávají.404 Na základě tohoto přístupu by tedy bylo možné 
argumentovat, že souhlas samotného státu k povolení humanitární akce ve vnitrostátním 
konfliktu nestačí. Zároveň je zapotřebí vzít v potaz reálnou aplikaci výše uvedeného, 
neboť je zřejmé, že v reálné situaci je pro poskytovatele humanitární pomoci souhlas 
nestátních aktérů nepostradatelný – z bezpečnostního i logistického hlediska by bylo 
vysoce riskantní snažit se humanitární pomoc poskytovat bez něj.405 
 
Přístup k humanitární pomoci a její distribuce 
 
 Přístup k humanitární pomoci zůstává nadále velkou výzvou, a to i v případech, 
když strany konfliktu daly k jejímu poskytování formální souhlas. Panuje obecná shoda, 
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že s povinností umožnit humanitární akci je spojena zároveň i povinnost umožnit rychlé 
a nerušené provedení takovéto akce. 406  Samotným udělením souhlasu role státu (či 
nestátních aktérů) nekončí, neboť výše uvedená povinnost nespočívá pouze v pasivním 
konání (tedy nerušení), ale i aktivním konání – strany konfliktu jsou povinny se aktivně 
přičinit o to, aby humanitární pomoc nerušeně a rychle dorazila ke svým příjemcům.407 
Na druhou stranu, pro vyvážení této povinnosti, MHP dává stranám konfliktu omezené 
právo kontroly nad distribucí i trasportem humanitární pomoci. A to jak po technické 
stránce – určení cest a časového rozvrhu, tak i faktické – právo provádět prohlídky k 
potvrzení, že obsah např. humanitárního konvoje opravdu obsahuje pouze předměty 
mající humanitární povahu (např. potraviny, léky, ošacení, apod.). 
  
 Na tomto místě by bylo vhodné upozornit, že čl. 18 Dodatkového protokolu II 
povinnost umožnit rychlé a nerušené poskytnutí a distribuci humanitární pomoci 
výslovně neobsahuje. Dle některých názorů je nicméně možné jej odvodit ze smyslu 
daného článku.408 Jiné se shodují na tom, že lze tuto povinnost vyvodit mezinárodního 
obyčejového práva.409 
 
Povinnosti třetích států 
 
 Co se týče povinností třetích států, obecně lze shrnout, že jak na smluvní, tak na 
obyčejové úrovni mezinárodní humanitární právo ukládá třetím státům povinnost 
umožnit rychlý a nerušený transport humanitární pomoci skrz jejich území. Jedinou 
výjimkou, co se týče smluvního zakotvení této povinnosti, jsou situace vnitrostátních 
konfliktů, neboť jak společný článek 3 Ženevských úmluv, tak článek 18 Dodatkového 
protokolu II tuto povinnost výslovně nezmiňují. Na úrovní obyčejového práva nicméně 
k jejímu vytvoření došlo.410 Obecně lze konstatovat, že práva a povinnosti třetích států 
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jsou tak téměř identická s právy státu cílového. Hlavní výjimkou tvoří oblast distribuce, 
ke které v tomto případě nedochází.   
  
Ochrana humanitárních pracovníků 
 
 Bezpečnost osob a zařízení poskytujících humanitární pomoc je jednou z hlavních 
komplikací, s kterými se poskytovatelé humanitární pomoci i státy samotné potýkají. 
Obzvlášť v posledních dvou desetiletích došlo k markantnímu nárůstu útoků na 
humanitární konvoje, pracovníky i zařízen.411 V tomto případě je nutné podotknout, že 
mezinárodní humanitární právo poskytuje všem výše uvedeným subjektům i objektům 
vysokou míru ochranu, a to jak na smluvní, tak na obyčejové úrovni.412 Problémem 
v tomto případě není nedostatečně nastavený právní rámec, nýbrž nedostatek respektu 
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 Diplomová práce se věnuje problematice humanitární pomoci v rámci 
mezinárodního humanitárního práva. Téma práce bylo vybráno s ohledem na jeho 
aktuálnost a také na základě osobního a dlouhodobého zájmu autorky. 
 
Práce se zaměřuje na právní prameny, z kterých koncept humanitární pomoci 
vychází. Dále se věnuje samotné historii humanitární pomoci a jejímu modernímu vývoji 
a principům, na kterých je založena. Samostatná kapitola je věnována taktéž otázce 
poskytovatelů a příjemců humanitární pomoci. Speciální pozornost je dána problematice 
souhlasu s poskytování humanitární pomoci a tomu, zda je takovýto souhlas vyžadován 
a od koho. Velká část práce se soustředí taktéž na poskytování humanitární pomoci, její 
distribuci a povinnosti třetích států. 
 
První kapitola práce je věnována úvodu, definici samotného pojmu „humanitární 
pomoci“, vymezení cílů práce, hlavních otázek a také způsobů a zdrojů, na základě 
kterých bude práce zpracována.  
 
Druhá kapitola podrobně rozebírá jednotlivé právní prameny, s kterými bude práce 
pracovat. Nejdříve se zaměřuje na smluvní právo - tedy především na příslušná 
ustanovení Ženevské úmluvy IV., Dodatkového protokol I a Dodatkového protokolu II. 
Pozornost je věnována taktéž Haagským úmluvám z roku 1899 a 1907 a Římskému 
statutu Mezinárodního trestního soudu. Následně pojednává o právu obyčejovém – zde 
se zaměřuje hlavně na Studii obyčejového mezinárodního humanitárního práva 
vypracovanou Mezinárodním Výborem Červeného kříže. 
 
 Třetí kapitola práce krátce představuje historii a vývoj humanitární pomoci. 
Začíná krátkým přiblížením období starověku a středověku a následně se věnuje dění 
v 19. a 20. století. Především pak vyzdvihuje následky iniciativy Henryho Dunanta po 
bitvě u Solferina a také zásadní změny, které přineslo přijetí Čtvrté ženevské úmluvy 





 Čtvrtá kapitola práce se zaměřuje na podmínky, které je nezbytné splnit k tomu, 
aby mohla být příslušná pravidla mezinárodního humanitárního práva upravující 
humanitární pomoc aplikována na konkrétní situaci – situaci mezinárodního konfliktu, 
neposkytnutí dostatečné humanitární pomoci primárním aktérem a stav, ve kterém se 
nachází civilní obyvatelstvo. 
 
 Pátá kapitola rozebírá poskytovatele a příjemce humanitární pomoci. Věnuje se 
jejich konkrétnímu vymezení a v případě poskytovatelů uvádí i pozitivní a negativní 
aspekty jejich zapojení. 
 
Šestá kapitola pojednává o povaze humanitární pomoci a jednotlivých principech, 
na základě kterých je tento institut založen. Přibližuje také význam a aplikaci principů 
humanity, nestrannosti a neutrality. 
 
 Sedmá kapitola práce je věnována problematice souhlasu. Klade si otázku, kdy a 
za jakých podmínek je udělení souhlasu zapotřebí, kdy je možné jeho udělení odepřít a 
kým má být udělen. 
 
 Předposlední, kapitola se dopodrobna zabývá otázkou poskytování a distribuce 
humanitární pomoci – jejímu materiálnímu vymezení, povinnosti států a nestátních aktérů 
umožnit přístup k humanitární pomoci a její distribuci. Zároveň rozebírá povinnosti 
třetích států v souvislosti s poskytováním humanitární pomoci. 
 
 Poslední, devátá, kapitola je věnována závěru. 






The thesis focuses on the issue of humanitarian assistance under international 
humanitarian law. The topic was chosen based on the personal interest of the author of 
the thesis and also based on the fact that it is a current and very discussed issue. 
 
The thesis is concerned with the legal sources governing the concept of 
humanitarian assistance. It also focuses on the history of the concept paying special 
attention to its modern development and to the principles on which it is based. Individual 
chapter is dedicated to the issue of providers and beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance. 
Special attention is also given to the issue of consent with the facilitation of humanitarian 
assistance, whether it is necessary to sough such a consent and from whom. Significant 
part of the thesis focuses on the facilitation and distribution of humanitarian assistance 
and the obligations of the third states. 
 
The first chapter of the thesis is dedicated to the introduction, definition of the term 
“humanitarian assistance”, aims and goals of the thesis, and also to the methods and 
sources. 
 
The second chapter focuses in a great detail on legal sources relevant to the thesis. 
First, it pays attention to the treaty law. Thus, it describes the relevant provisions of the 
Geneva Convention IV, the Additional Protocol I, and the Additional Protocol II. It 
discusses also The Hague Conventions 1899 and 1907, and Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. Secondly, it deals with the customary law paying special 
attention to the ICRC Customary Study on International Humanitarian Law. 
 
The third chapter of the thesis briefly introduce the history and development of 
humanitarian assistance. It goes back to the ancient and medieval times and then focuses 
on the development in the 19th and 20th century. It highlights especially the consequences 
of Henry Dunant’s initiative and also the major changes caused by the adoption of the 





The fourth chapter is interested in the conditions which it is necessary to fulfil in 
order for the relevant provision governing humanitarian assistance to be applicable on a 
particular case: a situation of armed conflict, inability of the primary actor to provide the 
assistance by itself, and certain level of suffering of the civilian population. 
 
 The fifth chapter deals with the providers and beneficiaries of humanitarian 
assistance. It focuses on their identity and definition. Regarding the providers, it is 
interested also in the pros and cons of their involvement. 
 
 The sixth chapter focuses on the character of humanitarian assistance and also on 
the principles on which the concept is based. Thus, it discusses the relevance and the 
application of the principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality. 
 
 The seventh chapter examines the issue of consent. It poses the question when and 
from whom it should be sought, and when it is possible to deny it. 
 
 The eight chapter focuses in a great detail on the issue of facilitation and 
distribution of humanitarian assistance: its material scope, the obligations of state and 
non-state actors, and the obligations of the third states. 
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